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CAROLYN WILKES KAAS* 
INTRODUCTION 
Third-party custody cases are disputes over the custody of a 
child between the biological or legally-adoptive parent and any 
third party.1 They force courts to face issues different from and 
more complex than those applicable in a traditional custody dispute 
between two biological parents whose status as "parent" is equal.2 
* Associate Professor of Law, Quinnipiac College School of Law. B.A., 1976, 
Cornell University; J.D., 1983, University of Connecticut School of Law. With thanks 
to my colleagues who found a way to give me oases of time away from the clinic for 
writing, to the many clinic students who worked with me on our third-party custody 
cases, and to the clinic staff who somehow kept track of the many drafts of this article. 
Special thanks to Cheryl and Kim, whose stories taught me about the heartache of 
third-party custody cases. 
1. In this article, the term "parent" refers only to biological parents and those 
who have adopted a child through appropriate legal channels, as long as the adoption is 
final. "Parent" does not include "psychological parents" or any other care-givers. The 
term "non-parent" includes grandparents, other members of the child's extended fam­
ily, and all "biological strangers," regardless of their level of emotional attachment to 
the child. Legally, their status as non-parent is the same. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438 
A.2d 755,758 n.3 (Conn. 1980). See also Lucy S. McGough & Lawrence M. Shindell, 
Coming ofAge: The Best Interests of the Child Standard in Parent-Third Party Custody 
Disputes, 27 EMORY L.J. 209, 212 n.19 (1978). 
2. Connecticut, like most other states, has adopted the "best interests of the 
child" standard for deciding which parent shall retain custody after dissolution of mar­
riage, CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56 (1995), or in any other custody dispute between par­
ents, regardless of whether they are married, living separately, or whether an action for 
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Rather, these cases require courts to protect the interest of the fam­
ily - parent and child - in remaining together, balancing that in­
terest against the needs of the child to be safe and well cared-for.3 
In this way, these custody cases have much more in common with 
guardianship cases in probate court4 and ab~se or neglect proceed­
ings in the Juvenile Matters Division of superior courtS than they do 
with parent-versus-parent disputes in superior court. 
In some jurisdictions, the courts6 apply the same standard to 
third-party custody disputes as they would to parent-versus-parent 
custody disputes'? Other jurisdictions apply different standards.8 
Connecticut, like a majority of these other jurisdictions,9 treats 
third-party custody cases differently from disputes between two 
parents. In 1985, the Connecticut legislature adopted a parental 
preference statute10 that presumes it is in the best interests of the 
dissolution or separation is pending, § 46b-61 (1995). The Connecticut custody and 
guardian statutes are gender-neutral. Since 1901, Connecticut has recognized that the 
rights of both parents to custody are equal. See Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A. 504,505 
(Conn. 1922) and § 45a-606 (1995), stating that both parents are joint guardians of their 
child. This statute has existed in some form since 1902. 
3. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1322 (Conn. 1983). 
4. §§ 45a-603 to 45a-622 (1995). See infra part II.B. 
5. §§ 17a-90 to 45a-622, 46b-120-46b-151g (1995). See infra part 1I.A.2. 
6. In some jurisdictions, the third-party custody standard is judicially created; in 
others, the legislature has mandated the test for the courts to apply. 
7. Hawaii, for example, has adopted a best interests test by statute and even gives 
a presumption of sorts to a non-parent with whom the child has been living: 
Custody may be awarded to persons other than the father or mother whenever 
the award serves the best interests of the child. Any person who has had de 
facto custody of the child in a stable and wholesome home and is a fit and 
proper person shall be entitled prima facie to an award of custody. 
HAw. REv. STAT. § 571-46(2) (Michie 1994). 
8. There are two types of approaches that differ from a best interests test. One is 
a "parental rights" standard, requiring that the parent be awarded custody unless the 
non-parent can show that the parent is unfit. See Sheppard v. Sheppard, 630 P.2d 1121 
(Kan. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 919 (1982); Michael B. Thompson, Child Custody 
Disputes Between Parents and Non-parents: A Plea for the Abrogation of the Parental 
Rights Doctrine in South Dakota, 34 So. OAK. L. REv. 534 (1989). The second ap­
proach is a moderate one, falling in between the best interests and the parental rights 
tests. The second test creates a presumption in favor of the parent. 
9. Several authors have attempted to assign a standard to each state and have 
reached different conclusions. Compare McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, at 214-15 
n.24 with Suzette M. Haynie, Note, Biological Parents v. Third Parties: Whose Right to 
Child Custody Is Constitutionally Protected?, 20 GA. L. REv. 705, 711 (1986). Some 
authors have simply made mistakes. Haynie counts Connecticut as a best interests state 
based on the case of McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984), cert. denied, 470 
U.S. 1050 (1985). Haynie at 721-26. The author overlooked that, in 1985, the legisla­
ture enacted § 46b-56b to overrule McGaffin. See infra part III.B. Even without Con­
necticut, Haynie counted 29 jurisdictions with presumption standards. Id. at 711 n.22. 
10. § 46b-56b. 
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child to be with her parent.ll Under the statute, proof by a prepon­
derance of the evidence that awarding custody to the parent would 
be "detrimental to the child" can rebut the presumption.12 
Third-party custody cases are decided within two contexts: re­
moval and reunification cases. What distinguishes the two is 
whether the parent-child custodial relationship is intact when the 
litigation ensues. If the child is living with her13 parent when the 
non-parent makes a claim for custody, the court must decide 
whether to remove the child from her home.14 If the child has al­
ready been in the care of someone other than her parent for a pe­
riod of time when the parent seeks custody, the court must decide 
whether to reunite the child with her parent,15 at the expense of the 
existing bond between the child and her third-party caretaker.16 
11. See infra part IIlB for a detailed discussion of the passage of § 46b-56b. 
12. Depending on the procedural posture of the case, the burden of persuasion 
may be on the parent to disprove detriment or on the non-parent to prove detriment. 
In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the mother had filed a motion for modifi­
cation to regain custody of her children from the paternal grandparents. The court held 
she had the burden of persuasion, just as any movant for modification would have. Id. 
at 915. See infra notes 125-132 and accompanying text. 
13. For ease of reference, I will refer in any hypothetical examples to the child as 
female and the parent as male. By no means do I suggest that the standards would vary 
in any way based on the gender of either the child or the parent. 
14. For example, a grandparent, concerned that neither of his granddaughter's 
parents are capable of caring for her, might intervene in the parents' divorce and re­
quest the court to award custody to him. 
15. For example, a child who has lived with her mother and stepfather for a 
number of years may become the subject of a custody dispute if the mother dies and the 
biological father seeks to take custody of the child from the stepfather. Or perhaps a 
parent has voluntarily entrusted her children to a distant family member or friend while 
she is ill or in a substance abuse treatment program, and the caretaker later refuses to 
return the children. 
16. There will always be cases that do not fall neatly into either of these catego­
ries. Consider, for example, a parent and child who live together with a non-parent and 
create a family unit. (The non-parent may be of the same or opposite sex as the parent, 
and it is irrelevant whether the two adults were married to each other.) If the parent 
and non-parent separate, the child will face removal from one or the other adults, both 
of whom have enjoyed a caretaking role in the child's life, and both of whom the child 
loves regardless of the biological factor. Consider also the facts of the case of Haftel v. 
Haftel, FA 91-0060834, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1892 (July 27, 1994). The child 
had lived since birth with his biological father and the father's Wife, whom the child 
believes is his biological mother. The child is the off-spring of a woman who was artifi­
cially inseminated with the father's sperm because of the wife's fertility problem. Now 
that the husband and wife are divorcing, the father is claiming a superior right to cus­
tody solely because of his genetic link to the child. 
One choice is to force cases such as these into either the removal or reunification 
category, based on whether the main focus is the child's separation from the parent or 
from the non-parent. A more logical approach is to treat these types of cases as identi­
cal to custody cases between two biological parents and apply a best interests test. The 
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Removal and reunification cases present courts with very dif­
ferent equitable considerations. Curiously, however, the Connecti­
cut courts and the legislature have not distinguished between 
removal and reunification cases, nor have they analyzed which facts 
are relevant in light of the differences. They also have not ex­
amined in any depth the similarities between third-party custody· 
cases and the other statutory schemes already in place for separat­
ing children from their parents: the guardianship and juvenile mat­
ters proceedings. These failures by both the courts and the 
legislature have created confusion in the courts about the effect of 
the presumption, the definition of detriment, and what type of evi­
dence is relevant to the court's inquiry. 
This Article examines the Con,necticut legislature's intent in 
adopting the presumption standard and explores the similarities be­
tween these custody cases and the other types of child removal 
cases. It also describes the jurisdictional and procedural considera­
tions that determine in what posture third-party custody cases ar­
rive in superior court. This Article recommends a method for 
applying the parental presumption in Connecticut by proposing va­
rying levels of proof and separate definitions of detriment that re­
spond to the fundamentally different questions presented by 
removal and reunification cases. 
I. OVERVIEW OF CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS 
The United States Supreme Court has held, in several cases, 
that biological parents have a fundamental liberty right to protect 
their relationship with their childrenP The Fourteenth Amend­
ment of the United States Constitution guarantees that the state 
cannot intervene in family matters absent a compelling need.Is At 
the root of the constitutional protection of parents' rights are two 
biological parent has participated in the creation of a family unit and encouraged the 
strong attachment between the child and the other adult. Having done so, he should be 
estopped from claiming any other basis for deciding custody. 
17. See, e.g., Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944); Skinner v. 
Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925); 
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923). 
18. The state's authority to intervene in a family actually comes from two distinct 
sources. The first is the state's inherent police power to prevent citizens from harming 
one another and to promote community and public welfare. The second is the paternal­
istic power to protect incompetents, to insure the individual incompetent's best interest 
and safety. For a thorough discussion of the two types of power, their origins, and their 
application, see Note, Developments in the Law: The Constitution and the Family, 93 
HARv. L. REv. 1156, 1198-1235 (1980) [hereinafter Developments]. 
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types of interests: the broad interest of each family member in insu­
lating the family from outside intervention19 and the interest of "the 
parent in protecting his or her relationship with and authority over 
the child. "20 The state also has its own interest in protecting family 
autonomy. Its interest normally converges with that of the family 
itself, because autonomy enhances warm, enduring, and important 
familial bonds21 and ensures that child-rearing is performed.22 
A parent's interest in having an on-going relationship with his 
children "undeniably warrants deference and, absent powerful 
countervailing interest, protection. "23 The message from a series of 
Supreme Court cases is that the Constitution will protect biological 
parent-child relationships for those parents who have developed an 
actual relationship with their children and have shouldered their 
parental responsibilities.24 The Constitution also protects the pa­
rental rights of parents who are having trouble living up to their 
responsibilities, requiring states to prove unfitness by clear and con­
vincing evidence before it can terminate a parent's rights.25 The 
Court has observed that the "fundamental liberty interest of natural 
parents in the care, custody and management of their child does not 
19. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166, (stating that there is a "private realm of family life 
which the state cannot enter"); Developments, supra note 18, at 1313. The child also 
has an interest in protecting her family from attack, so long as the family is capable of 
caring for her. 
20. Developments, supra note 18, at 1313 (citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 
(1972». Despite the plea from social scientists that courts should act solely in the 
child's interests, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN, ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE 
CmLo, (1973). There are remarkably few cases recognizing broad, individual rights of 
children, independent of those that they have as members of a family. See Hon. 
Charles D. Gill, Essay on the Status of the American Child, 2000 A.D.: Chattel or Consti­
tutionally Protected Child-Citizen?, 17 OHIO No. U. L. REv. 543 (1991). 
21. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 652 (1972); Developments, supra note 18, at 
1313-14. 
22. Prince, 321 U.S. at 166 (holding the parents' "primary function and freedom 
include preparation [of the child] for obligations the state can neither supply or hin­
der.") (citing Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925». However, there are 
times when the state must initiate intervention in a dysfunctional family, such as in the 
case of child abuse or neglect, or when the state is invited to step in because the family 
unit is openly fractured by divorce. 
23. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651. 
24. There are three "unwed father" cases that limit the Stanley language, all of 
which involved termination of the father's parental rights so that the mother's new hus­
band could adopt the children. Whether or not the Court held that the Constitution 
protected the father's relationship with his children turned on the quality of the parent­
child relationship and level of responsibility that the father had demonstrated. Lehr v. 
Robertson, 463 U.S. 248 (1983); Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979); Quilloin v. 
Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978). 
25. Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
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evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or 
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State."26 In con­
trast, the Constitution does not protect a relationship between a 
child and a non-parent even if that relationship "stems from the 
emotional attachments that derive from the intimacy of daily associ­
ation. "27 Thus, parental status and biological ties continue to playa 
major role in the constitutional protection analysis of the rights of 
parents and non-parents. 
A presumption standard, like the one enacted by the Connecti­
cut legislature, is undoubtedly a constitutionally valid approach for 
a state to choose in resolving third-party custody disputes. It is con­
sistent with the emerging message from the Supreme Court that bi­
ology is an important, but not the exclusive, mark of parenthood. 
The Connecticut test allows a court to recognize the biological ties 
without being blind to other factors displayed by the parent, such as 
the level of par~ntal responsibility and commitment to the child. 
Analysis of whether a legal standard is constitutional does not 
end, however, with an examination of the standard's language. It is 
for the trial courts to apply the standard to the facts of each case 
and to decide when the presumption is overcome. To do so, the 
Connecticut courts must define the phrase "detrimental to the 
child" in a manner consistent with the complex guidelines estab­
lished by the Supreme Court. 
The recognition that a third-party custody dispute involves 
either a removal or a reunification scenario begins to put some 
structure in the determination of what detriment means. A re­
moval case necessarily involves an intact family.28 The court must, 
therefore, tread lightly when considering removal by setting a very 
high hurdle for the non-parent to overcome. In a reunification 
case, the court may find the parent's rights are offset by the child's 
interest in preserving her ties with her existing psychological family. 
26. Id. at 753. 
27. Smith v. Organization of Foster Families, 431 U.S. 816,844-46 (1977) (quoting 
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 231-33 (1972». The Court stressed that the foster 
family relationship is not protected because the state is the contractual source of the 
relationship. Id. at 845. However, biology does not guarantee constitutional protec­
tion. In Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989), the Court upheld a California 
statute prohibiting a biological father from challenging the presumption that a mother's 
husband is the father of the mother'S child born during the marriage. The Constitution 
does not preclude a state from preferring the family unit that the mother and her hus­
band have created, even if the biological link between husband and child is absent. 
28. All that is necessary to create an "intact family" is one parent residing with 
one child. 
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The biological family's right to be together again has not disap­
peared, but it may very well have faded in intensity, allowing the 
courts to find more easily that the non-parent has rebutted the 
presumption. 
II. SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION IN CONNECTICUT 
A. Superior Court 
1. Family Relations Matters 
Beginning in colonial days, the Connecticut probate court29 
had primary jurisdiction to decide custody and other matters con­
cerning the welfare of children.30 The superior court had only the 
power to decide custody between parents, incidental to a divorce 
action,31 and to decide actions brought by writ of habeas COrpUS.32 
The Connecticut legislature has consistently expanded the su­
perior court's authority to act in child custody matters; all "family 
relations matters" are now within the jurisdiction of the superior 
court.33 The superior court has subject matter jurisdiction to make 
custody orders in dissolution, annulment, and legal separation 
cases.34 It also has jurisdiction over complaints for custody filed by 
parents living separately, regardless of their marital status or 
whether any other type of action is pending.35 Habeas corpus cases 
continue to be family relations matters within the equitable powers 
of the superior court, although there is no longer any need for a 
parent to use this type of equitable proceeding against another 
29. Probate courts are courts of limited jurisdiction created by statute. CONN. 
GEN. STAT. § 45a-98 (1995); Prince v. Sheffield, 259 A.2d 621 (Conn. 1969). 
30. The Connecticut Supreme Court previously held that even a modification of 
custody between former spouses was not within the jurisdiction of the superior court 
but rather, was a matter for probate court. Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A. 504 (Conn. 
1922), overruled by Freund v. Burns, 40 A.2d 754 (Conn. 1944). . 
31. [d. 
32. LaBella v. LaBella, 57 A.2d 627, 629 (Conn. 1948). 
33. Several types of custody disputes are now defined by statute as family rela­
tions matters. See § 46b-1. Family relations matters also include cases brought under 
the provisions of §§ 46b-90 to 46b-114, the Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act 
("UCCJA"). However, the UCCJA does not grant to the superior court subject matter 
jurisdiction over additional types of cases. The underlying case would have to be an 
action brought pursuant to §§ 46b-56, 46b-61, or a habeas case. The UCCJA sets forth 
criteria and procedures for deciding which state should il.sue initial decrees and modifi­
cations of custody. The purpose of the UCCJA, adopted at least in part in all 50 states, 
is to avoid jurisdictional competition among the states. §§ 46b-90 to 46b-114. 
34. § 46b-56. 
35. § 46b-61. Many habeas cases would now fit within this statute. See Pi v. 
Delta, :roo A.2d 709 (Conn. 1978); Doe v. Doe, 307 A.2d 166 (Conn. 1972). 
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parent.36 
The habeas corpus action has existed from "time immemo­
rial."37 Originally, it was the only procedural route available for a 
parent to test another's right of custody in superior court, other 
than in a pending divorce or separation action.38 Only parents have 
standing to bring a habeas corpus case.39 The power of the superior 
court to decide custody in the absence of specific statutory author­
ity arose from the court's inherent equitable powers.40 Because 
children were considered wards of the state, the court could act on 
36. A parent seeking custody from the other parent would move in superior court 
to modify the previous order or would initiate an action pursuant to § 46b-61. The 
Connecticut Appellate Court has taken a broad view of the types of cases over which 
the superior court has jurisdiction, refusing to sustain objections that amount to form 
over substance. See Franklin v. Dunham, 510 A.2d 1007, 1008 n.1 (Conn. App. Ct. 
1986). The Franklin case involved a complaint for custody brought by an unmarried 
father against the mother and maternal grandparents. The court stated that the habeas 
action would have been the "usual method" of bringing the action but was not the 
"exclusive method." Id. Indeed, the case could have been pleaded as an action pursu­
ant to § 46b-61 with an intervening non-parent. Id. The court properly recognized that 
the trial court had subject matter jurisdiction whether or not the plaintiff had clearly 
articulated the basis for that jurisdiction in his complaint. Id. 
37. LaBella v. LaBella, 57 A.2d 627,629 (Conn. 1948). 
38. Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A.2d 540, 541 (Conn. 1965), overruled by Hao Thi 
Popp v. Lucas, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980). 
39. The issue of who has standing is rarely discussed in the old habeas cases, 
probably because all were brought by parents who obviously did have standing. More 
recent cases support the conclusion that only parents and other persons who legally 
have custody of a child can properly bring a habeas petition. In Doe v. Doe, 307 A.2d 
166 (Conn. 1972), a man brought a writ against his ex-wife for custody of their son and 
her daughter from a prior relationship. The court quashed the writ as to his request for 
custody of his step-daughter but allowed his case for custody of his biological son to 
proceed. In Pi v. Delta, 400 A.2d 709 (Conn. 1978), the Connecticut Supreme Court 
decided for the first time that an illegitimate father had standing to bring a habeas 
corpus case for custody of his child. Then, in Nye v. Marcus, 502 A.2d 869 (Conn. 
1985), superseded by statute, the court refused to grant standing to foster parents, stat­
ing that only parents and legal guardians have standing to bring a writ of habeas corpus. 
Id. at 873. 
There is now a very limited exception to this standing rule. In 1988, the Corinecti­
cut legislature granted foster parents and approved adoptive parents standing to make 
application for a writ of habeas corpus under some circumstances, thereby overruling 
the Nye holding. § 52-466(f). Otherwise, the courts have continued to limit the stand­
ing of others. In Weidenbacher v. Duclos, 640 A.2d 147 (Conn. App. Ct. 1994), the 
court refused to grant standing to a man claiming to be the biological father of a child 
born during the marriage of the child's mother to another man. The husband's name 
was on the child's birth certificate and he was adjudicated to be the child's father at the 
time of his divorce from the mother. In June 1994, the Connecticut Supreme Court 
accepted certification on the issue of standing but has not yet ruled. Weidenbacher v. 
Duclos,644 A.2d 917 (Conn. 1994). 
40. Howarth, 208 A.2d at 543. 
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behalf of the state as parens patriae ,41 to decide custody for the pro­
tection of the child.42 
Ihird-party custody disputes are family relations matters 
within the jurisdiction of superior court and may be either removal 
or reunification cases. They may arrive at superior court by either 
of two main paths. The first is the habeas corpus action.43 If a child 
is living with a non-parent,44 a parent has standing to file a habeas 
corpus action to seek custody of his child. By definition, this type 
of case would be a reunification case. In contrast, a removal case 
cannot proceed as a habeas case because the non-parent has no 
standing to initiate the action.45 Connecticut does confer, however, 
a broad right of intervention on non-parents.46 If a custody action 
41. Parens patriae means "parent of the country." BLACK'S LAW DICI"IONARY, 
1114 (6th ed. 1990). The term was first used by the English Chancery Court, initially 
referring to the rights of lords to profit from wards and later evolving into the doctrine 
authorizing and obligating the state as "supreme guardian" to intervene in families to 
protect infants, lunatics, and idiots. Lawrence B. Custer, The Origins o/the Doctrine of 
Parens Patriae, 27 EMORY L.J. 195, 195-200 (1978); McGough & Shindell, supra note 1, 
at 209 n.2. See also In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 16 (1967); Thompson, supra note 8, at 551­
61. 
42. Howarth, 208 A.2d at 543. 
43. Although the court's authority to grant habeas corpus relief is an inherent 
power, Connecticut now has a statute that codifies that authority. CONN. GEN. STAT. 
§ 52-466 (1995). 
44. This may have occurred because of a voluntary placement by the parent seek­
ing reunification or by the other parent. If the superior court had previously granted 
custody to a non-parent, a parent could also initiate a reunification proceeding by filing 
a motion to modify custody. 
45. The only non-parents with standing to bring a habeas corpus petition are 
those who already have a legal right to the custody of the child, such as a legal guardian 
or a foster parent. See supra note 39. 
46. Section 46b-57, in effect in substantially the same form since 1973, states: 
In any controversy before the superior court as to the custody of minor chil­
dren, and on any complaint under this chapter or section 46b-1 or 51-348a, if 
there is any minor child of either or both parties, the court if it has jurisdiction 
under the provisions of chapter 8150, may allow any interested third party or 
parties to intervene upon motion. The court may award full or partial custody, 
care, education and visitation rights of such child to any such third party upon 
such conditions and limitations as it deems equitable. Before allowing any 
intervention, the court may appoint counsel for the child or children pursuant 
to the provisions of section 46b-54. In making any order under this section the 
court shall be guided by the best interests of the child, giving consideration to 
the wishes of the child if he is of sufficient age and capable of forming an 
intelligent preference. 
Id. 
Courts must interpret this latter sentence in light of the presumption standard of 
§ 46b-56b. Otherwise, the courts have construed the statute broadly. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court has even upheld the right of a court to consider a non-parent as a puta­
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between parents happens to be pending in superior couit,47 a non­
parent may intervene and initiate a removal case by asking the 
court for custody. If there is no custody action already pending in 
which to intervene, the non-parent who seeks to wrest a child away 
ftom a parent is limited to filing a guardianship case in probate 
court or contacting the Department of Children and Families 
("DCF"). 
2. Juvenile Matters 
The Juvenile Matters Division of the superior court has the au­
thority to hear those cases defined as "juvenile matters."48 Several 
types of these cases require a judge to decide whether there is cause 
to remove a child from her home and place her with a non-parent 
and, thus,.bear resemblance to a third-party custody case. 
All juvenile matters are subject to the statutorily expressed 
public policy of this state: 
To protect children whose health and welfare may be adversely 
affected through injury and neglect; to strengthen the family and 
to make the home safe for children by enhancing the parental 
capacity for good child care; to provide a temporary or perma­
nent nurturing and safe environment for children when neces­
sary; and for these purposes to require the reporting of suspected 
child abuse, investigation of such reports by a social agency, and 
provision of services, where needed, to such child and family.49 
Any state intervention, whether custody or the ultimate action of 
termination, interferes with a compelling interest on the part of the 
tive custodian even if she has not formally intervened. Cappetta v. Cappetta, 490 A.2d 
996,998 (Conn. 1985). 
47. One or the other parent could have initiated the action pursuant to either 
CoNN. GEN. STAT. §§ 46b-56 or 46b-61 (1995), depending on whether the parents are 
married and, if so, whether they wish to divorce. Presumably, the intervention statute 
would apply if yet a second non-parent sought custody and joined an ongoing action 
brought pursuant to a habeas petition by a parent against a non-parent. 
48. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-121 (1995) states: 
Juvenile matters include all proceedings concerning uncared-for, neglected or 
dependent children and youth and delinquent children within this state, termi­
nation of parental rights of children committed to a state agency, matters con­
cerning families with service needs and contested termination of parental 
rights transferred from the probate court, but does not include matters of 
guardianship and· adoption or matters affecting property rights of any child or 
youth over which the probate court has jurisdiction. 
Id. 
Since the enactment of 1993 Conn. Acts 344 (Reg. Sess.), contested guardianship 
cases transferred from probate court are also juvenile matters. 
49. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 17a-101(a) (1995). 
215 1995] DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD 
parent and the child to stay together.50 Thus, the statutes must be 
narrowly drawn and must reflect the policy that a child should be 
kept in her home whenever possible, even if the home is only mar­
gina1.51 Accordingly, the legislature and the courts have prescribed 
in detail the procedure by which a juvenile matters case is to be 
presented and adjudicated. It is an action initiated by a representa­
tive of the DCF.52 In the first53 "adjudicatory" stage, the court is to 
determine whether the child is "uncared for, neglected or depen­
dent."54 The state must prove the child's status by a preponderance 
of the evidence.55 If the court finds that the child is either uncared­
for, neglected, or dependent, the judge has three "disposition" op­
tions: committing the child to the commissioner of DCF for a pe­
50. In re Juvenile Appeal (83-CD), 455 A.2d 1313, 1318·(Conn. 1983). 
51. Id. at 1320. 
52. In contrast, a private party usually initiates a guardianship case. Third-party 
custody cases also involve private parties competing for custody. A juvenile matters 
case can result from a complaint filed with DCF by a private person, who is immune 
from suit. § 17a-103. Additionally referral may made by a professional who is required 
to report cases of suspected abuse or neglect. § 17a-101(b). 
53. There are emergency provisions that may actually precede the adjudicatory 
stage. For example, a physician who suspects that a child has been abused may keep the 
child in the hospital without a parent's consent for up to ninety-six hours. § 17a-101(d). 
Other provisions allow the court to remove a child and grant temporary custody to the 
commissioner of DCF if there is probable cause to believe the child was seriously in­
jured or is in immediate danger of suffering serious injury. §§ 46b-129(b)(2), §17a­
·I01(e). 
54. Section 46b-129(d) establishes as the standard for removal a finding that a 
child is "uncared-for, neglected or dependent." ·Section 46b-120 defines these terms as 
follows: 
[A] child or youth may be found "dependent" whose home is a suitable one 
for him, save for the financial inability of his parents, parent, guardian or other 
person maintaining such home, to provide the specialized care his condition 
requires; ... a child or youth may be found "neglected" who (i) has been 
abandoned or (ii) is being denied proper care and attention, physically, educa­
tionally, emotionally or morally or (iii) is being permitted to live under condi­
tions, circumstances or associations injurious to his well-being or (iv) has been 
abused; a child or youth may be found "uncared-for" who is homeless or 
whose home cannot provide the specialized care which his physical, emotional 
or mental condition requires. 
Id. 
The term "abused" means that a child or youth: 
(a) has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him other than by acci­
dental means, or (b) has injuries which are at variance with the history given 
of them, or (c) is in a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but 
not limited to, malnutrition, sexual molestation, deprivation of necessities, 
emotional maltreatment or cruel punishment. 
Id. 
55. In re Juvenile Appeal, 471 A.2d 1380, 1385 (Conn. 1984). 
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riod of up to eighteen months, and placing the child in foster care;56 
vesting the child's care and custody to a third person or agency;57 or 
permitting the parent to retain custody, with or without protective 
supervision.58 If the child is committed for eighteen months, the 
state (through DCF) must provide a whole panoply of services to 
the family and offer the parents assistance in rehabilitating them­
selves and remaining in contact with the child.59 During the time 
that the child is committed, the parent has the right to move to 
revoke the commitment.6o The parent has the burden to prove the 
cause for the commitment no longer exists, and if successful, the 
state has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence 
that the revocation would be detrimental to the child.61 At the end 
of the eighteen months,62 the state may seek to continue that place­
ment, to return the child home, or to move for termination of the 
parent's rights.63 Termination, which severs permanently the legal 
56. § 46b-129(d). During the commitment period, the commissioner of DCF is 
the child's legal guardian. § 17a-98. Prior to 1979, there was no time limit on the length 
of a commitment. The purpose of the time period is to expedite permanency planning 
for the child. In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 488 A.2d 790, 798 (Conn. 1985). 
57. § 46b-129(d). The courts appear to use this disposition option very rarely. 
According to the Supreme Court, such a placement has no eighteen month time limit. 
In re Juvenile Appeal, 488 A.2d at 797. At least one court has called this arrangement a 
guardianship, In re Jessica S., 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2177, (August 24, 1994), 
making this option virtually indistinguishable from guardianship ordered by a probate 
court, or for that matter, a third-party custody case. 
58. § 46b-129(d). See In re Juvenile Appeal (85-BC), 488 A.2d 790 (Conn. 1985), 
for a discussion of the three options. 
59. The state has a duty to provide services to the parents of a child adjudicated 
as uncared-for, neglected or dependent, for the purpose of aiding in rehabilitation and 
reunification. In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,603 (Conn. 1990). 
60. § 46b-129(g). 
61. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881 (Conn. 1979). The 
Connecticut Supreme Court identified four factors for the courts to consider when de­
termining whether revoking a commitment would be detrimental to the child: (1) the 
length of the child's stay in foster care; (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the 
foster parents; (3) the degree of contact that the parent has maintained with the child; 
and (4) the nature of the child's relationship with her parent.Id. at 882-83. Id. See also 
In re Juvenile Appeal, 485 A.2d 1355 (Conn. App. Ct. 1985). 
62. The statutes do allow the state to bring coterminous petitions for the adjudi­
cation of neglect and the termination of parental rights, rather than waiting for eighteen 
months. 
63. Section 17a-112 mandates the criteria for terminating parental rights. There 
are four statutory bases, written in the disjunctive with the result that proof of one is 
sufficient. § 17a-112(b). The court must also make a finding that termination is in the 
child's best interests and must consider seven statutory factors. § 117a-112(d); In re 
Michael M., 614 A.2d 832 (1992); In re Emmanuel M., 648 A.2d 904 (Conn. Super. Ct. 
1993). 
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ties between parent and child,64 carries with it the requirement that 
the state prove its case by clear and convincing evidence.65 
While there are many procedural differences between third­
party custody cases and juvenile neglect proceedings, the basic simi­
larity remains: the court is faced with deciding whether cause exists 
to separate, or continue to separate, a parent and child in their day­
to-day existence. 
B. Probate Court 
The original broad authority of the probate courts narrowed as 
the legislature expanded the reach of the superior court, but pro­
bate courts do retain significant subject matter jurisdiction in cer­
tain matters involving children. Probate courts have jurisdiction in 
guardianship cases,66 adoption, and the termination of the rights of 
parents whose children are not committed to a state agency such as 
DCF.67 
A guardian has the right of care and control of the child.68 
Parents are automatically considered joint guardians of their chil­
dren unless one or both are removed from that capacity by a pro­
bate judge.69 Any adult relative of the child may petition the 
64. Tennination is: 
the complete severance by court order of the legal relationship, with all its 
rights and responsibilities, between the child and his parent or parents so that 
the child is free for adoption, except it shall not affect the right of inheritance 
of such child or the religious affiliation of such child. 
§ 17a-93(e). See also § 45a-707(g). 
65. The standard of proof is prescribed by statute, but is also mandated by the 
United States Constitution. § 17a-112; Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982). 
66. §§ 45a-603 to 54a-622. Even though the probate court has jurisdiction over 
these cases, contested guardianship cases now can be transferred upon motion to the 
juvenile matters division of the superior court. 1993 Conn. Acts 93-344 (Reg. Sess.). 
67. §§ 45a-706 to 45a-757. Contested tennination of parental rights cases may 
also be transferred to the juvenile matters division of superior court. § 45a-715(g). The 
defined standards for tennination of parental rights in probate court and superior court 
are the same. Compare § 45a-717 with § 17a-112. The Connecticut Supreme Court has 
detennined that both sets of statutes must be construed in a similar manner. In re 
Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,602 n.6 (Conn. 1990). 
68. Section 45a-604(5) defines "guardianship" of a minor as: "(A) The obligation 
of care and control; and (B) the authority to make major decisions affecting the minor's 
welfare, including, but not limited to, consent detenninations regarding marriage, en­
listment in the anned forces and major medical, psychiatric or surgical treatments." Id. 
69. Section 45a-606 state~: 

The father and mother of every minor child are joint guardians of the person 

of the minor, and the powers, rights and duties of the father and the mother in 
regard to the minor shall be equal. If either father or mother dies or is re­
218 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 17:205 
probate court to remove a parent as guardian.70 The guardianship 
statutes71 set forth in detail the stringent circumstances under which 
the court may remove the parent,as guardian,72 and when reinstate-
moved as guardian, the other parent of the minor child shall become the sole 
guardian of the person of the minor. 
Id. 
70. § 45a-614. The court on its own motion, or counsel for the child, may also 
petition to remove the parent as guardian. 
71. There is some confusion about whether § 46b-56b applies to guardianship 
cases that are appealed or transferred to superior court from probate court. An ag­
grieved party may appeal a probate decision to superior court. § 45a-186. Under § 46b­
1, an appeal of a guardianship case is considered a family relations matter and therefore 
within superior court jurisdiction. Pursuant to a relatively new law, a party may also 
transfer a contested guardianship case to superior court. See 1993 Conn. Acts 344 (Reg. 
Sess.), adopted July 2, 1993. The new rules of court assign those cases now to the juve­
nile mattersC:livision of superior court. Rule 8, Probate Rules. 
It is unlikely that either appeal or transfer of a guardianship case would render 
§ 46b-56b suddenly applicable to it. Although appeals are de novo proceedings, the 
superior court is to decide the case as if sitting as a probate court, applying its control­
ling statutes and having only the powers of a probate court. Appeal of Stevens, 255 
A.2d 632 (Conn. 1969). Therefore, a superior court judge would apply the guardian 
statutes on an appeal, as would a juvenile matters judge after transfer. 
In two recent guardianship appeal cases, however, the superior court judges cited 
§ 46b-56b, and in at least one of these cases, the probate judge had apparently also 
applied the statute .. In Hawes v. Probate Court, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 869, 
(Apr. 8, 1994), the judge overturned a probate judge's decision denying a father'S appli­
cation for reinstatement as guardian. Judge Harrigan cited habeas case law and § 46b­
56b as support for his conclusion that the grandmother had not overcome the presump­
tion in favor of the father. In Regish v. Gray, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1653, (June 
29, 1994), the judge affirmed a probate court ruling reinstating a mother as guardian. 
The probate court had found, and the superior court agreed, that the mother had over­
come the factors that had resulted in her removal as guardian and that the grandparents 
had not rebutted the presumption. 
72. Section 45a-61O requires clear and convincing evidence of one of the 
following: 
(1) The parent consents to his or her removal as guardian; or 
(2) the minor child has been abandoned by the parent in the sense that the 
parent has failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern or re­
sponsibility for the minor's welfare; or 
(3) the minor child has been denied the care, guidance or control necessary 
for his or her physical, educational, moral or emotional well-being, as a result 
of acts of parental commission or omission . . . ; or 
(4) the minor child has had physical injury or injuries inflicted upon him by a 
person responsible for such child's health, welfare or care, or by a person 
given access to such child by such responsible person, other than by accidental 
means, or has injuries which are at variance with the history given of them or 
is in a condition which is the result of maltreatment such as, but not limited to, 
malnutrition, sexual molestation; deprivation of necessities, emotional mal­
treatment or cruel punishment. 
Id. 
Section 45a-607 sets. forth a very high standard for temporary custody while the 
application for removal is pending, such as a finding of "imminent physical danger." Id. 
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ment of the parent's guardianship is appropriate.73 The burden of 
proof in a guardianship matter is always On the non-parent,74 and 
he must prove his case by clear and convincing evidence. 
There are significant similarities between "custody" and 
"guardianship." The term "custody" is sometimes used by courts to 
mean different things, but it is fair to conclude that custody applies 
to less than all the rights and duties of a parent.75 A guardian has 
the broadest range of the rights and duties of caring for a child, but 
the right to custody of the child is certainly the principal attribute of 
guardianship of the person.76 Although the statute conferring joint 
guardianship on both parents is qualified by the power of the supe­
rior court to grant custody to one or the other of the parents,?7 the 
loss of physical and legal custody in a divorce or other custody ac­
tion in superior court technically does not divest the non-custodial 
parent of his guardianship rights. 
For practical purposes, however, guardianship and custody are 
very similar concepts.78 Both carry with them the privileges and 
obligations of decision-making and the daily care of the child; the 
custody decision and the guardianship decision both determine the 
primary residence of the child. A superior court order granting cus­
tody to a third-party in lieu of a parent has, therefore, substantially 
the same effect as a probate court order removing a parent as 
guardian of his child and appointing a non-parent in his stead. 
73. § 45a-611. 
74. See § 45a-61O, supra note 72, and In re Guardianship of A & B, 5 Conn. Pro­
bate L.J. 15 (1989). 
75. Paul Sayre, Awarding Custody of Children, 9 U. CHI. L. REv. 672 (1942). For 
example, a noncustodial parent has not lost his right to visit, and he still has the duty to 
support the child. 
76. Boardman v. Boardman, 62 A.2d 521 (Conn. 1949). 
77. Freund v. Bums, 40 A.2d 754 (Conn. 1944). 
78. Pursuant to § 45a-608, a person granted temporary custody of a minor while 
an application to remove a parent as a guardian is pending has the following rights and 
duties: "(1) the obligation of care and control; (2) the authority to make decisions 
regarding routine medical treatment or school counseling and emergency medical, psy­
chological, psychiatric or surgical treatment." Id. 
These rights and duties are very similar to those of § 45a-604(5), except for the 
language limiting the decisions making power of temporary custodians to "routine" and' 
"emergency" decisions rather than "major" decisions. 
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A. Pre-statutory Caselaw 
1. Habeas Corpus Cases 
The older Connecticut third-party custody cases were reunifi­
cation cases brought by writ of habeas COrpus,79 No reported deci­
sions discuss the differences between removal and reunification 
cases or recognize that the equities might vary depending on which 
kind of case is involved. This is not surprising. Because third-party 
removal cases could not reach superior court until the intervention 
statute was enacted in 1973, the distinction was unnecessary.80 
Prior to 1985, there was no statute defining the standard decid­
ing third-party cases; the standard was judicially created. The Con­
necticut Supreme Court repeatedly held that in parent-versus-non­
parent cases, the court must give "paramount consideration to the 
welfare of the child"81 and that "the legal rights of no one, including 
a parent, are allowed to militate against this."82 Because these 
cases were reunification cases, the courts were perhaps predisposed 
to view biology as an impediment to maintaining the existing posi­
tive environment for the child. It is not surprising, then, that the 
Connecticut Supreme Court chose strong words to direct the trial 
courts' focus to the child. 
In a more recent habeas case, however, the Connecticut 
Supreme Court reemphasized the primacy of parental status. In 
Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas ,83 also a reunification case, the court ac­
knowledged that a trial court should decide custody according to 
79. See, e.g., Baram v. Schwartz, 197 A,2d 334 (Conn. 1964); Claffey v. Claffey, 64 
A,2d 540 (Conn. 1949). 
80. Even after the intervention statute gave the superior court subject matter ju­
risdiction, cases decided in superior court fail to differentiate between removal and 
reunification cases . 
.81. Dunham v. Dunham, 117 A,2d 504 (Conn. 1922), overruled by Freund v. 
Bums, 40 A,2d 754 (Conn. 1944) (purporting to establish the same test for parent ver­
sus parent and parent versus stranger cases). 
82. Pi v. Delta, 400 A,2d 709, 710 (Conn. 1978); Sullivan v. Bonafonte, 376 A,2d 
69,71 (Conn. 1977); Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A,2d 540, 543 (Conn. 1965), overruled by 
Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438 A,2d 755 (Conn. 1980). 
83. 438 A,2d 755 (Conn. 1980). The facts of this case are compelling. The natural 
mother had given up her children in 1975 in the final, chaotic days of the Viet Nam War 
to assure their safe transport to the United States. She was able to follow them a short 
time later and in 1976 immediately began trying to undo the adoption to which she had 
consented in desperation. Of course, the rule the supreme court announced was not 
limited to facts as extremely sympathetic as these. 
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the child's best interests, but held that the parent should have a 
"strong initial advantage, to be lost only where it is shown that the 
child's welfare plainly requires custody to be placed in the stran­
ger."84 Indeed, the court even called its rule a "presumption" and 
specifically overruled several older habeas cases that, in stressing 
the interests of the child, failed to give sufficient weight to the par­
ent as against the third-party.85 
2. The Me Gaffin Decision 
The presumption standard announced in Haa Thi Papp was 
the state of the law when the case of MeGaffin v. Raberts86 reached 
the Connecticut Supreme Court. A classic reunification case, Me­
Gaffin was a habeas corpus action brought by a natural father for 
c.ustody of his four year old daughter who lived with her maternal 
grandmother after the death of her mother. The trial court had 
granted custody to the grandmother in spite of the statute giving 
sole guardianship to the surviving parent.87 In affirming the trial 
court's decision, the Connecticut Supreme Court noted that "the 
relationship between parent and child is constitutionally pro­
tected"88 but went on to adopt an expansive definition of a parent. 
The court approached the issue functionally and rejected a status 
argument based on genetics.89 The court dismissed the joint guard­
ian statute as nothing more substantive than "an expression of the 
natural importance of parenthood," simply one of the many factors 
in determining the best interests of the child yo The court con­
cluded by expressly adopting a best interests test for parent-versus­
non-parent cases. 
The "best interests of the child" test focuses solely on the inter­
ests of the child and treats the legal status of the putative custodians 
as largely irrelevant. A best interests test defines the relative bene­
84. Id. at 758 (quoting In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881 
(Conn. 1979)). Significantly, the court used as its authority a termination of parental 
rights case. 
85. See Howarth v. Norcott, 208 A.2d 540 (Conn. 1965), overruled by Hao Thi 
Popp, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980); Antedomenico v. Antedomenico, 115 A.2d 659 
(Conn. 1955), overruled by Hao Thi Popp, 438 A.2d 755 (Conn. 1980). 
86. 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984), cen. denied, 470 U.S. 1050 (1985). 
87. Section 45-43 is now codified at § 45a-606, and provides that parents are joint 
guardians. If either parent dies or is removed as guardian, the other parent "shall be­
come the sole guardian of the person of the minor." Id. 
88. McGaffin, 479 A.2d at 180 (citing Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 255 
(1978)). 
89. Id. 
90. Id. at 183. 
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fits to the child of being with one or the other party.91 It requires 
the court to compare the total package of attributes of the two po­
tential custodians: their homes, their larger environments, and their 
relationships with the child.92 The two adults start on a level play­
ing field. Anyone factor, even a small one, can tip the scale in 
either direction. 
By the time the Connecticut Supreme Court decided MeGa/­
fin, the intervention statute had existed for over ten years and, thus, 
the superior courts had subject-matter jurisdiction over both 
reunification and removal cases. The Connecticut Supreme Court, 
however, did not discuss in MeGaffin the possible range of cases to 
which this rule would apply, nor did the language of the decision 
limit the use of the best interests test to reunification cases. Rather, 
the decision allowed judges to decide third-party removal cases us­
ing the same criteria as in parent-versus-parent custody disputes. 
The supreme court could easily have upheld the trial court on a 
much narrower basis, the special facts of the case. The existing 
close bond between the child and the grandmother was clearly an 
important factor for both the trial judge and the supreme court. 
Rather than changing the test for. deciding all third-party custody 
cases, the court could have followed existing precedent, used the 
Hao Thi Popp presumption test, and found that the particularly 
close bond between this child and her grandmother was sufficient to 
prove that her welfare "plainly required"93 she remain with the 
grandmother. Instead, the court adopted a broad best interests rule 
that, even if arguably appropriate in a reunification case,94 would 
91. Robert H. Mnookin, Child-CustOdy Adjudication: Judicial Functions in the 
Face of Indeterminacy, 39 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS. 226, 257-61 (1975). 
92. In Connecticut, § 46b-56 does not enunciate the factors to consider. Some 
states do have best interests statutes enumerating specific factors. See, e.g., COL. REv. 
STAT. § 14-10-124 (1989) and VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3 (Michie 1990). The UNIFORM 
DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE Acr identifies the following factors as relevant to the con­
sideration of what is in the child's best interests: . 
(1) the wishes of the child's parent or parents as to his custody; 
(2) the wishes of the child as to his custodian; 
(3) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with his parent or parents, 
his siblings, and any other person who may significantly affect the child's best 
interest; 
(4) the child's adjustment to his home, school, and community; and 
(5) the mental and physical health of all individuals involved. 

The court shall not consider conduct of a proposed custodian that does not 

affect his relationship to the child. 

U.M.D.A. § 402, 9A U.L.A. 561 (1991). 
93. Hao Thi Popp v. Lucas, 438 A.2d 755, 758 (Conn. 1980). 
94. There is authority that limits the use of the best interests test in third-party 
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also apply to a removal case. This rule created the possibility that a 
parent could lose custody of his child to a non-parent for even insig­
nificant reasons, including those that would never constitute a suffi­
cient basis for a probate judge to remove a parent as guardian or 
justify commitment and placement in a foster home by a juvenile 
matters judge. 
This lack of uniform standards between the courts created an 
opportunity fora non-parent to forum shop. A potential litigant 
had the choice of intervening in a pending superior court family 
matters action, filing a guardianship case in probate court, or pursu­
ing a matter through a report to DCF. Depending on which court 
the non-parent chose, the dispute would be decided under different 
standards and quite possibly would result in. different custodial 
outcomes. 
3. The Dissent in Me Gaffin 
Justice Parskey dissented in MeGaffin,95 advocating an ap­
proach more reminiscent of the Hao Thi Popp case. Arguing that 
the majority had not adequately balanced thr: welfare of the child 
and the constitutionally-protected interests of the parent, he wrote 
that the joint guardianship statute created a true presumption that a 
surviving parent is entitled to custody. Thus, the burden should be 
on the non-parent to disprove the parent's priority.96 Justice Par­
skey concluded that, to meet this "heavy" burden,97 the non-parent 
must "prove that it would be detrimental to the best interests of the 
child to live with the parent. "98 He further articulated that neither 
a better standard of living99 nor proof that the move would be pain­
ful loO was sufficiently "detrimental" to rebut the presumption. 
custody disputes to cases where the child is not living with the parent. Vnder the 
V.M.D.A., a non-parent has no standing to bring a third-party custody case unless the 
child is not living with the parent. V.M.D.A. § 401(d}(2}, 9A V.L.A. 550 (1991). If the 
non-parent has standing because the child is not with the parent, then the case is de­
cided under the same best interests test applied in parent versus parent cases. Com­
ment, V.M.D.A. §401 at 550. 
95. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176, 185 (Conn. 1984}, cert. denied, 470 V.S. 
1050 (1985). 




100. Id. Justice Pars key did express a reservation about a test that would focus 
on the effect a move would have on the child. He feared a divorce would effectively 
sever the caretaking relationship between the child and her noncustodial parent and 
thus make it difficult for him to prevail in a later custody dispute. Courts might con­
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Like the majority, Justice Pars key did not expressly differenti­
ate between reunification and removal cases, but his examples show 
he was contemplating the existence of both types. Furthermore, 
although he did not specifically discuss the need for uniform stan­
dards in all the courts, he proposed an approach that would require 
the superior court to decide a removal case in a manner consistent 
with a guardianship removal case and a reunification case with an 
approach similar to a guardianship reinstatement case. 
B. The Presumption Statute 
Justice Parskey's dissent resonated within the legal community. 
In the following year, 1985, the Connecticut legislature considered 
legislation to change the standard for parent versus non-parent cus­
tody disputes.lOl Members of both the House and Senate acknowl­
edged openly that the move behind House Bill 5122 was to 
overturn the majority opinion in Me Gaffin and to adopt Justice 
Parskey's dissent.102 The law would also make more consistent the 
standards in superior and probate courts. The Judiciary Committee 
heard testimony that the proposed standard was "key[ed] to the 
guardian statutes."103 
The first version of the bill called for a simple statement that 
"[p]arents have a joint superior right to custody."l04 The Judiciary 
Committee reported favorably on the bill but recommended 
amending the language to create a presumptionlOS in favor of par­
strue any upset in the child as sufficient to overcome a parent's claim for custody. For 
this reason, Justice Parskey stated that it is not enough to demonstrate that the non­
parent provides a "nurturing environment." Rather, "the non-parent must prove that it 
would be detrimental to the child to take her out of that environment and place her 
with the parent." Id. 
101. H.B. No. 5122, 1985 Sess. (1985). 
102. 28 H.R: PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2611. (Apr. 17, 1985) (statement of Rep. 
Wollenberg); 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1751-52. (Apr. 30, 1985) (statements of Sens. 
Streeter and Johnston). 
103. Conn. Standing Comm. Hearings, Judiciary, on H.B. 5122, 1985 Sess. 219 
(Feb. 20, 1985) (Statement of Raphael Podolsky of Connecticut Legal Services). Courts 
usually restrict analYSis of legislative histories to the comments of legislators made dur­
ing the debates on the floor of tl;le House of Representatives or the Senate. However, 
when committee testimony illustrates the purpose of the legislation, and serves as the 
basis for subsequent legislative action, Connecticut courts do consider such testimony. 
In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 n.1O (Conn. 1990). 
104. H.B. No. 5122; 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2612 (Apr. 17, 1985). 
105. The effect of a presumption is confused by the imprecise treatment of the 
term by both courts and legislatures. JOHN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, 
§ 344,586 (4th ed. 1992). According to McCORMICK, the best definition of a presump­
tion is a rule that "require[ s] the party denying the existence of the presumed fact [to] 
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ents and require a showing of detriment by clear and convincing 
evidence to overcome the presumption.106 The House passed this 
version of the Bill,107 but it was defeated in the Senate.l08 The Sen­
ate debate included references to the conflict between parents' 
rights and children's rights109 and concern about the need to protect 
children.110 Although one senator described the legislation as sim­
ply trying to "harmoniz[e] ... the best interests of the child stan­
dard, with a policy declaration relative to the rights of a parent,"111 
the sentiment that the bill might weaken the court's ability to save 
endangered children from bad parents seemed to carry the day. 
The proponents of the bill did their homework, evidently con­
sulting with some of the senators who had opposed the bil1.112 They 
amended the bill to remove the "clear and convincing" standard 
and the language concerning detriment. The change was consid­
ered a "compromise"113 by senators, resulting in a bill that did "not 
give as much to the natural parent by any stretch of the imagination 
that the original bill would have."114 The plan worked, however, 
and the amended bill passed the Senate.115 
The House also passed the amended bill.116 The original pro­
ponents agreed that the bill was weaker than they had planned but 
assume the burden of persuasion." Id. § 342, at 578. The presumption is a method for 
assigning the burden of persuasion on the basis of an explicit substantive policy consid­
eration. Id. § 344, at 586-89. 
106. The House of Representatives amended H.B. No. 5122 on April 17, 1985. 28 
H.R. 	PROC., Pt. 8, 1985 Sess. 2615. Substitute House Bill 5122 read: 
In any dispute as to the custody of minor children involving a parent and a 
non-parent, there shall be a presumption that it is in the best interest of the 
child to be in the custody of the parent, unless it is show [sic], by clear and 
convincing evidence, that it would be detrimental to the child to permit the 
parent to have custody. 
Id. 
107. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 8,1985 Sess. 2618 (Apr. 17,1985). 'The vote was 143 in 
favor, 4 opposed. 
108. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1763 (Apr. 30,1985). The vote was 15 in favor, 
21 opposed. 
109. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 1751-61 (Apr. 30, 1985) (statements of Sens. 
Streeter, Avallone, Zinsser, and Consoli). 
110. Id. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Miller). 
111. [d. at 1757 (statement of Sen. Johnston). 
112. 28 S. PROC., Pt. 5, 1985 Sess. 2231 (May 8,1985) (remarks of Sen. Johnston). 
113. [d. at 2242 (comments of Sen. Avallone). Senator Avallone had previously 
voted against the bill but was now endorsing it after the amendments. 
114. [d. 
115. [d. at 2243. The vote was 32 in favor, 3 opposed. 
116. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 16, 1985 Sess. 5811 (May 14, 1985). The vote was 130 in 
favor and 17 opposed. Public Act 85-244 Section 2 read as follows: "In any dispute as to 
the custody of minor children involving a parent and a non-parent, there shall be a 
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observed that it still overturned Me Gaffin and adopted the Parskey 
dissent.117 
Compromise and last~minute language changes may get a bill 
passed, but they may also wreak havoc on the ability to decipher a 
legislative history and with the ability of practitioners and trial 
court judges to apply the law consistently. The 1985 Act gave no 
hint of what proof was necessary to rebut the presumption in favor 
of parents. The next year, the House added language clarifying that 
the presumption was rebuttable and reinserted the requirement 
that, to rebut it, the court'must find that "it would be detrimental to 
the child to permit the parent to have custody."118 The bill's propo~ 
nents did not attempt to add a requirement that the showing had to 
be proven by "clear and convincing evidence." The bill passed,119 
although once again amid debate about the need to protect families 
as an intact unit versus the need on occasion to protect children 
from these very families.120 The statutory language has remained 
untouched since 1986 and provides: 
In any dispute as to the custody of a minor child involving a 
parent and a nonparent, there shall be a presumption that it is in 
the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent, 
which presumption may be rebutted by showing that it would be 
detrimental to the child to permit the parent to have custody.121 
Section 46b~56b unquestionably overrules the basic approach 
of MeGaffin. It represents a substantive statement of policy by the 
legislature that third~party custody cases are not simply a compari~ 
son of all the attributes of the potential custodians. No minor fac­
tor is to determine what is in the child's best interests, tipping the 
presumption that it is in the best interest of the child to be in the custody of the parent." 
1985 Conn. PUb. Acts 244 (Reg. Sess.). 
117. 28 H.R. PROC., Pt. 16,1985 Sess. 5800-01, 5805-06 (May 14, 1985) (comments 
of Reps. Wollenberg,.Thlisano, and Frankel). 
118. Substitute H.B. No. 5607, 1986 Sess. Testimony before the Judiciary Commit­
tee revealed that this bill was proposed to fix mistakes made in 1985. 
That is the language that was actually in the Bill at one point last year, and got 
lopped off in a dispute over whether the standard of proof should be clear and 
convincing evidence or a preponderance of the evidence. The legislature ulti­
mately opted for preponderance of the evidence, but in doing so, it took off 
half the Bill and this part should never have been removed from the Bill. 
Hearings on H.B. 5607 Before the Conn Standing Comm., Judiciary, 1986 Sess. 549 
(March 3, 1986) (remarks of Raphael Podolsky). 
119. 1986 Conn. Acts 224 (Reg; Sess.). 
120. 29 S. PRoc., Pt. 8, 1986 Sess., pp. 2538-41 (Apr. 30,1986) (comments of Sens. 
Avallone, Johnston, and Streeter). 
121. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 46b-56b (1995). 
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scale away from the parent. The legislature left no doubt that the 
constitutionally protected parent-child relationship is not to be dis­
rupted so easily. 
What is not immediately clear from the legislative history is the 
type and quantity of evidence required to constitute detriment suf­
ficient to overcome the presumption. The law, by virtue of its ap­
plicability to all third-party custody cases in superior court, sets the 
standard in both removal and reunification cases. Any construction 
of section 46b-56b must be broad enough to address the menu of 
diverse factual patterns that give rise to these cases. The construc­
tion must enable the courts to balance the parents' and children's 
needs, whether or not the custodial relationship between parent 
and child is intact at the time the court is faced with the decision. 
It is unfortunate that the legislators did not discuss the ramifi­
cations of the fact that they were passing a law applicable to such a 
wide array of cases. There was no detailed discussion on the floor 
of the House or Senate of the kinds of cases to which this law would 
apply and no clear distinction drawn between reunification or re­
moval scenarios. Nor did some of the legislators seem to under­
stand how this law would fit into the existing framework of child 
protection laws,122 Because the debate centered needlessly and su­
perfluously on the obvious proposition that "sometimes courts have 
to remove children from dangerous homes," the legislators missed 
an important opportunity to examine closely the similarity of fact 
patterns and policy concerns123 behind guardianship and third-party 
custody cases. In doing so, they lost a chance to create a consistent 
standard for probate court and the family and juvenile matters divi­
sions of superior court.l24 
Section 46b-56b goes a long way towards harmonizing the 
122. For example, changing the third-party custody standard in superior court did 
not affect the authority of juvenile matters judges to intervene in families to protect 
children at risk of abuse and neglect. The law also did not alter the ability of probate 
court judges to remove parents as guardians when the need arises. Some of the legisla­
tors appeared to believe that they were fixing some flaw in the child removal statutory 
schemes by removing the "clear and convincing" evidence language in the third-party 
custody bill, when all they were really doing is creating inconsistency across the courts. 
123. It would be overstating the legislative history to explain the final bill as a 
result of an overemphasis on a reunification case scenario, which is, after all, the kind of 
case McGaffin was. There is no evidence that the legislators were creating a rule lim­
ited to reunification cases. 
124. At other times, the legislature has been clear that its intent was to create 
consistent standards. Public Act 83-478, for example, was passed "to standardize the 
criteria applied for termination of parental rights by the Probate and Superior Courts." 
In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597,603 n.9 (Conn. 1990). 
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third-party custody standard with those of the guardianship and ju­
venile matters cases, but it does not quite reach the mark. The polit­
ical process of compromise diluted the original version of section 
46b-56b by removing the clear and convincing standard of proof 
and leaving unanswered the question of which party has the burden 
of proof. The persuasiveness of the guardianship and juvenile mat­
ters statutes and caselaw is uncertain. Furthermore, as long as the 
possibility exists that the courts will interpret section 46b-56b as set­
ting a standard different than the other child removal statutes, the 
potential for forum-shopping by non-parents remains obvious. 
Despite these problems, the passage of the current version of 
section 46b-56b was a significant event. Connecticut's creation of a 
presumption in favor of parents means it joined the majority of ju­
risdictions in rejecting the use of the same standard in parent-ver­
sus-parent and parent-versus-non-parent custody cases. By 
explicitly overruling McGaffin, the legislature put its stamp of ap­
proval on the reasoning and language of Justice Parskey's dissent. 
To achieve the legislature's intended result, the courts must con­
strue the phrase "detrimental to the child" as more than just any 
harm. The presumption is not rebutted unless the harm to the child 
is substantial. 
C. Connecticut Decisions Applying Section 46b-56b 
1. Appellate Cases 
There are only a few appellate cases involving third-party cus­
tody disputes decided since the legislature passed the presumption 
law. In 1989, the Connecticut Supreme Court had its first opportu­
nity to construe section 46b-56b.12s In Perez v. Perez 126 a mother 
125. Chronologically, the first appellate decision involving a third~party custody 
dispute decided after the passage of the statute was Evans v. Santoro, 507 A.2d 1007 
(Conn. App. Ct. 1986). This case was initiated by writ of habeas corpus filed by a 
mother for custody of her daughter. The child had resided with her paternal grandpar­
ents for approximately two years after the death of her father, the custodial parent. The 
trial court awarded custody to the mother and the appellate court affirmed. However, 
neither court relied on § 46b-56b. The appellate court did note the existence of the new 
law in a footnote, but stated that it did not apply, presumably because the trial court 
memorandum was issued prior to the effective date of the public act. [d. at 10lD, n.3. 
The court held that the trial court had properly weighed the mother's "significant and 
constitutionally protected right to the companionship, care, custody and management of 
her child," but did not let the right "inhibit its search for the best interest of that child." 
Id. The court ruled that the mother had standing but also had the burden of proof 
because she sought to change custody. Id. at 1008-10. Without the benefit of the bal­
ancing that the legislature had performed and imposed on the triers of fact by way of 
enacting § 46b-56b, the court had to reinvent a mechanism for balancing both parental 
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sought to regain custody of her son from his paternal grandparents. 
In a procedurally complicated reunification case,127 the supreme 
court upheld the trial court's decision to return the child to her 
mother, but also affirmed the trial court's holding that the mother, 
as the moving party, had the burden of proving that it was in the 
child's best interests to be in her custody.128 The supreme court, in 
its decision, emphasized that section 46b-56b does not "affect[ ] the 
trial court's obligation to award custody upon the basis of the 
child's best interests"129 and cited the majority decision in MeGa/­
fin for support of its conclusion that the best interests standard is 
still the "ultimate basis" of the custody decision.13° The court never 
acknowledged that the legislature enacted the statute to overrule 
the majority opinion in Me Gaffin and adopt the dissent.131 Instead, 
the court described the statute as more of an evidentiary procedural 
device than a substantive statement of policy and accepted the trial 
court's limited description of the effect of the presumption as an aid 
to the parent by providing that" '[i]f the opposing party's evidence 
fails to prove the rebutting facts ... [the] presumption must be ac­
cepted as true. "'132 
The appellate court has also limited the impact of the enact­
ment of section 46b-56b. In Busa v. Busa,133 a reunification case 
decided in 1991, the appellate court reviewed a trial court decision 
granting custody to a grandparent over a parent. The trial court 
had ignored section 46b-56b, five years after its enactment, and had 
and children's rights and was loath to deviate from the best interests test. The court 
hinted in dictum that even if it applied the presumption of § 46b-56b, the allocation of 
the burden of proof would have been the same: "The presumption ... does not shift the 
burden of proof in a custody dispute between a parent and a non-parent, but makes that 
burden easier to sustain because it gives the parent an initial advantage." Id. at 1010 
n.3. 
126. 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989). 
127. Plaintiff mother filed a motion to modify a foreign state child custody de­
cree. The dissolution had been granted by the Connecticut Superior Court, but a Pu­
erto Rico court had ruled on the custody issue under the UCCJA. The court held that, 
as the movant seeking a modification, the plaintiff had the burden of proof just as in any 
post-judgment divorce case. Id. at 915. 
128. Id. 
129. Id. at 916. 
130. Id. 
131. In a footnote, the court admitted only that "McGaffin was decided before 
the enactment of General Statutes § 46b-56b." Id. at 915 n.13. The court never men­
tioned the legislative history of the statute. 
132. [d. This is an unnecessarily limited and mechanical view of the effect of a 
presumption, criticized by STRONG, supra note 105, and others. 
133. 589 A.2d 370 (Conn. App. Q. 1991). 
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applied a best interests test. The appellate court did find error and 
remanded the case but did so in the gentlest of ways. Stating that 
the best interests test "remains the ultimate basis of a court's cus­
tody decision,"134 the court, citing Perez, simply held that section 
46b-56b and Connecticut Practice Book § 4059,135 read together, re­
quire a trial court to articulate whether the presumption was prop­
erly rebutted.136 The court remanded the case for an articulation of 
this holding, but did not seem to entertain the possibility that apply­
ing the proper statutory standard might very well change the result. 
These cases reveal a resistance on the parts of the Connecticut 
Supreme and Appellate Courts to implement fully the intent of the 
legislature. The courts seem reluctant to leave behind the best in­
terests test and tend to minimize the law's impact as only a proce­
dural or semantic change, not a substantive change. The appeals 
courts have yet to define comprehensively what detriment means 
and do not acknowledge that the statute forbids a court from en­
gaging in a comparison of the characteristics of the two competing 
custodians and deciding custody based on what each may have to 
offer to a child. 
The decisions do not discuss the differences between removal 
and reunification cases or the different factual issues that are rele­
vant to each of these two kinds of cases. Only Perez contains any 
description at all of what detriment means in a reunification case. 
In that case, the supreme court held that the child's unavoidable 
pain upon separation from the third-party custodian was not suffi­
cient to constitute detriment to the child.137 Faced with a poor rela­
tionship between the child and her mother, the court also 
determined that, when a parent-child relationship would improve if 
nurtured, the opportunity to nurture that relationship must be 
134. Id. at 371. Significantly, in a case decided two weeks earlier, Bristol v. Brun­
dage, 589 A.2d 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 1991) (citing Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 
1989», the appellate court stated in dicta that the presumption of § 46b-56b was not a 
best interests test. That case involved the effect of a parent's testamentary appointment 
of a guardian for a minor child. The court, faced with a choice between the guardian 
designated by the parent and a third party, drew an analogy to § 46b-56b and chose to 
create a judicial presumption in favor of the parent's choice for guardian. The court 
found that the third-party had failed to rebut the presumption by showing it would be 
detrimental for the child to be with the guardian named in the parent's will. Id. at 2-3. 
135. CONNEcrlCUT PRACflCE BOOK § 4059 states in relevant part that "the court 
shall include in its decision its conclusion as to each claim of law raised by the parties." 
Id. 
136. Busa, 589 A.2d at 371. 
137. Perez, 561 A.2d at 915-16. 
231 1995] DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD 
given.138 
Finally, neither the Connecticut Supreme nor Appellate Court 
have used its power of statutory interpretation to address the prob­
lematic lack of consistent standards in the various lower courts. 
The decisions contain no evaluation of how similar, in terms of pol­
icy and in practice, the third-party custody, guardianship, and juve­
nile matters cases can be. Thus, the courts offer little guidance on 
the applicability of the case precedent from the other statutory 
schemes to the third-party custody situation. 
2. Trial Courts 
Several superior court trial judges have decided cases since 
1985 that required them to choose between a natural parent and a 
non-parent.139 These included both removal and reunification 
cases. Once again, no judges drew a distinction between the two 
kinds of cases or attempted to define their task in terms of this anal­
ysis. The opinions fall all over the spectrum in reasoning and result, 
sometimes functioning as nothing more than a best interests test. 
None of these opinions contains a clear definition of detriment. 
There are significantly more reunification cases than removal 
cases among the reported trial court decisions.140 Busa v. Busa,141 
138. Id. at 916. These comments echo Justice Parskey's dissenting opinion in Mc­
Gaffin, where he observed that neither a better standard of living nor proof that a move 
would be painful to the child should be sufficiently detrimental to rebut the parental 
preference. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176 (Conn. 1984). 
139. There are no statistics available regarding how often in the last decade Con­
necticut judges have decided third-party custody cases. A LEXIS search of the statute 
number for section 46b-56b yields fourteen cases. One is a miscitation and five are 
cases where the judge refers to the statute as an analogy. See supra notes 71 and 134, 
and infra note 159. However, this is not the entire universe of § 46b-56b cases. There is 
at least one other trial court decision from 1990 not reported on LEXIS and there may 
be more. Search of LEXIS State library, Conn. file (Jan. 16,1995). See infra note 209, 
for a discussion of one unreported case. 
140. This case type distribution, skewed in the direction of reunification cases, is 
bound to continue so long as the current habeas corpus standing rules remain. As dis­
cussed supra notes 43-47 and accompanying text, a removal case is only possible if there 
is a pending custody action between the parents in which the non-parent may intervene. 
The guardianship case in probate court will most likely continue to be the predominant 
procedural vehicle used by a non-parent challenging the parent's custody. For example, 
a LEXIS search locates only two removal cases decided pursuant to § 46b-56b, search 
of LEXIS, State library, Conn. file (Jan. 16, 1995), while there are approximately 800 
guardianship cases filed each year in Connecticut. Hearings on S.B. 644 Before the 
Conn. Standing Comm. on the Judiciary, 1993 Sess. 1896 (March 19, 1993) (remarks of 
Probate Judge Robert Killian) (speaking in opposition to the proposed law to allow 
litigants to transfer contested guardianship cases to superior court, passed as Public Act 
93-344.) 
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is one such reunification case. In Busa, the children had been in the 
custody of their paternal grandparents for approximately five years 
when the mother filed a motion to modify custody.142 On remand, 
the trial court cited section 46b-56b and concluded that it would be 
detrimental to remove them from the care of their grandparents.143 
The court did not address the present capability of the mother to 
care for her sons,l44 stressing instead the positive attributes of the 
grandparents. The judge's opinion concluded in essence that be­
cause the boys were fine where they were, the court should not 
move them. He assumed, without detailed analysis, that to move 
children, even to a parent they knew well and with whom they had 
spent significant time, would be too difficult for them.145 
Sherman v. Shermanl46 involved a custody dispute between a 
father and his children's maternal grandparents. At the time the 
court ruled, the children were nine and seven years old and had 
been living with the grandparents for nine months.147 
The judge examined several types of factors in his ruling. He 
cited approvingly the Family Relations Officer's conclusion that 
141. Busa v. Busa, No. FA 82-011277, 1991 Conn. Super. 0. LEXIS 1351 (June 7, 
1991). 
142. The natural mother and father had originally agreed to the children being in 
the custody of the grandparents when the mother apparently chose to move to Massa­
chusetts to attend school. The custody agreement was in writing and filed in the court 
in the dissolution action file. However, the grandparents did not intervene formally 
until the mother challenged their custody in 1989. Id. 
143. The opinion contains harsh opinions about the mother, focussing on her past 
selfishness and misjudgments. The judge found the mother to be a selfish woman be­
cause she had refused to take her children back after the grandfather had been seriously 
injured and had required round-the-clock care. The court concluded that, in the past, 
she "was interested only in having a good time for herself." Busa, 1991 Conn. Super. 
Ct. LEXIS 1351 at *9. 
144. The mother was remarried to a nuclear engineer in the Navy. 
145. The judge cited and apparently relied on the Family Relations Officer'S opin­
ion that "a change could cause unnecessary adjustment problems for these two broth­
ers." Busa, 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1351 at *9. According to the court's opinion, 
the mother visited her sons weekly when she lived in Massachusetts and, after moving 
to South Carolina, they visited her for the summers in 1986 and 1987 and for one month 
in 1988. Id. 
146. FA 90-0269208, 1991 Conn. Super. 0. LEXIS 2353 (July 29, 1992). The 
mother had custody of the children after the divorce. The father later sought custody. 
For some reason not reported in the decision, the mother arranged for the children to 
live with her parents. The maternal grandparents then moved to intervene in the pend­
ing case, and the dispute crystallized between the father and grandparents. 
147. This is a reunification case, even though the children had been living with the 
grandparents for only a short time. They had been living apart from their father for 
much longer due to their parents' divorce and their custodial relationship with the fa­
ther had already been disrupted. 
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"the move alone" would be substantially detrimental to the chil­
dren. l48 Then the court's focus turned to the father's characteris­
tics. The court questioned his parenting skills and found that the 
father's rented room was not suitable for children, contrasting it to 
the spacious suburban home in a residential neighborhood in which 
the grandparents lived. Finally, the court recited the father's past 
convictions for child molestation and weapons possession and his 
history of violence toward the mother.149 
The judge stated at the outset of his ruling that he took section 
46b-56b into consideration but did not explain further what evi­
dence rebutted the presumption. Nor did the judge specifically 
state which of these facts constituted detriment. He simply con­
cluded by finding that "it is in the best interests of the children" to 
be in the custody of the grandparents. Perhaps, after making so 
many factual findings negative to the father, he thought it would be 
obvious, but the opinion leaves questions about how the judge de­
fined the standard and how close the standard is to a best interests 
test. 
Other cases contain more discussion of how the court applied 
section 46b-56b to the facts. In the case of In re Jacqueline D. ,150 
the judge had before him consolidated family and neglect cases. 
The custody action was between a father and the paternal grand­
parents. l5l Although the two actions were distinct procedurally, 
the question before the court was the same: was the ten year old 
child to remain with her grandparents, as they and the Department 
of Children Services ("DCYS") sought, or to be reunited with her 
father for the first time in over eight years?152 The court was mind­
ful of section 46b-56b and its presumption in favor of the father and 
also of the caselaw giving parents a "strong advantage" in cases 
brought by DCYS. The judge found that both the grandparents and 
148. Sherman, 1991 Conn. Super Q. LEXIS 2353 at *4. One can assume the 
judge was referring to the normal process of adjustment. 
149. These facts reflect the father's past and are, therefore, not the type of evi­
dence that necessarily demonstrates present detriment. The opinion contains no discus­
sion of the correlation between the father's past problems and his current ability to care 
appropriately for his children. 
150. No. N87-128, No. 823411992 Conn. Super. Q. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15, 1992). 
151. Id. at *1. The court had committed the child in 1988 to the care of the com­
missioner of the Department of Children and Youth Services ("DCYS"), which was 
renamed in 1993 to DCF. DCYS had placed her in the home of her grandparents where 
she had remained for almost five years. 
152. Id. at *5. The mother was not seeking custody. 
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DCYS had met their burdens, concluding it would be detrimental to 
the child to live with her father. 
The judge's ruling was a mixture of an analysis of the father's 
parental skills and the effect on the child of moving. Using factors 
spelled out by the Connecticut Supreme Court for deciding whether 
to revoke the commitment of a child to the care of DCYS, the court 
looked at: (1) the length of the child's stay with her grandparents; 
(2) the nature of her close relationship with her grandparents; (3) 
the degree of contact with her father; and (4) the nature of her 
strained relationship with the father.153 The court then recited sev­
eral facts relevant to these considerations. The father had been a 
primary caretaker of the child for less than a year more than eight 
years prior to the proceedings. The child expressed fear of her fa­
ther and had a strong preference for staying with her grandparents. 
The court further found that the father could not provide a secure, 
violence-free home for the child. He had evaded a court-ordered 
home study and often had no housing. The father's plan for his 
daughter did not provide for continuation of the child's necessary 
counseling or her educational and social activities. In short, the 
court concluded that to award custody to the father would be detri­
mental to the child because it would "deprive her of the only secure 
and stable home she has had during the ten-and-a-half years of her 
life and plunge her into unchartered (sic) territory."154 
Most recently, the judge in Foster v. Devino,155 a removal case, 
gave a detailed analysis of his factual basis for awarding custody to 
a non-parent. The court applied section 46b-56b.156 Although the 
judge did not spend much time defining his terms, his approach re­
vealed that he read its impact to be quite similar to that of a guardi­
anship case or juvenile matters proceeding. 
In Foster, the children, ages three and four and one half, had 
lived with their mother since birth. The mother initiated a custody 
action against her children's father to whom she had never been 
married. The paternal grandparents intervened and sought cus­
153. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875 (Conn. 1979). However, 
neither the supreme court that identified the factors nor the trial court that applied 
them explained why these are the relevant considerations or defined what weight the 
court should give to each of them. 
154. In re Jacqueline D., 1992 Conn. Super. a. LEXIS 1037 at *17. 
155. FA 94-0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994). 
156. Id. at *9-11. This was the proper standard. The grandparents intervened in 
a custody action between the unmarried parents filed under § 46b-61. 
235 1995] DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD 
tody.157 Factually, the court found that the mother's poor judgment 
and insight left her with limited ability to meet the physical and 
emotional needs of her two young children. The judge also cata­
logued numerous injuries the children had suffered and concluded 
that, at a minimum, the mother had done a poor job of supervising 
her children. She had refused parenting assistance from the DCF, 
had subverted visitation with the father and grandparents, and had 
failed to recognize the impact of her actions on her children. The 
court concluded that the mother's "traits impact negatively on the 
[mother's] desire and ability to instill, in the children, respect for 
truth and authority and therefore [the mother's traits] will work to 
their detriment."158 Although the court's final summation speaks in 
terms of it being in the "best interests" of the children to be with 
their grandparents, it is clear that the judge did not decide this case 
using a traditional best interests test. Rather, he reached this ulti­
mate conclusion because he found that the grandparents had rebut­
ted the presumption by proving it would be substantially 
detrimental to the children to remain with their mother. 
These trial court decisions159 demonstrate the confusion that 
results from the lack of a clear definition of detriment and the fail­
ure to distinguish between reunification and removal cases. Some 
judges have begun to articulate the factors they found relevant, and 
at least one has adopted factors from a juvenile matters case, but 
there is yet to be a consensus among the courts. Without a well­
157. Id. at *2. The natural father lived with his parents but was never a candidate 
for custody. 
158. Id. at *17-18. 
159. There is one other reported trial court third-party custody matter not dis­
cussed in this article because it is on appeal and was scheduled to be argued on October 
3, 1995. There are four other recent cases, that are not actually custody cases, where 
§ 46b-56b is applicable, but the court has referred to the standard in each case, either 
mistakenly or by analogy. See note 71, supra, for a discussion of two guardianship cases 
where the superior court applied § 46b-56b on appeal. In the case of In re Aracelli G., 
1993 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 3242, (Dec. 9, 1993), the judge used § 46b-56b as analo­
gous precedent for deciding a father'S motion for custody, which he had filed in a ne­
glect proceeding that the state had initiated against the child's mother. The juvenile 
matters judge originally had removed the child from her mother'S care and had placed 
her with her maternal grandmother. The court granted the father's motion, concluding 
that, consistent with the policy behind § 46b-56b, the child should be with her father 
rather than her grandmother, and that in this case it would cause the child no detriment 
to order the change in custody. In Garrett v. Appeal from Probate, CV 93-0308807, 
1994 Conn. Super. O. LEXIS 2308 (Sept. 8,1994), Judge Levin again referred to § 46b­
56b as evidence of the state's policy in favor of parents. Nonetheless, in this particular 
appeal from a probate court's decision, he agreed with the probate judge that the re­
moval of the father as guardian was appropriate. 
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defined policy behind the presumption standard, a recognition that 
removal and reunification cases are fundamentally different, or a 
coherent framework of criteria, trial judges are left to decide for 
themselves what detriment means. 
IV. How MUCH DETRIMENT SHOULD IT TAKE? 
Black's Law Dictionary defines detriment as "raJny loss or 
harm suffered in person or property."160 A "plain language" or lit­
eraP61 construction of the statutory provision suggests that a show­
ing of any harm to the child that would be occasioned by awarding 
custody to the parent would establish "detriment" sufficient to re­
but the parental presumption. But can it really be that easy? If 
detriment to the child means any harm, no matter how minimal or 
short-term, then the rebuttable presumption dissolves into a best 
interests test so that the effect of the presumption is illusory.162 
To give the term "detriment" meaning in this context, one must 
look beyond the pages of the dictionary.163 Indeed, breathing life 
into the concept requires analysis of the policies at work in both 
removal and reunification cases. 
A. Removal Cases 
In a removal case, the court should examine only the parent's 
capability to meet the child's basic needs, and the non-parent 
160. BLACK'S. LAW DIcnONARY, 451 (6th ed. 1990) (emphasis added). 
161. A definition that reflects the way people use a word in common parlance is a 
"lexical" definition. IRVING M. COPI, INTRODUCTION TO LoGIC, 143-44 (7th ed. 1986). 
Lexical definitions often have the disadvantage of being ambiguous and uncertain. 
162. For example, a court would be free to say it is "harmful" for a child not to 
have the best home or school or the most well-educated parent, regardless of whether 
the child is really in any danger at home, or whether the parent is incapable of caring 
adequately for the child. 
Courts and commentators have advised against using a best interests test, espe­
cially in parent-grandparent disputes: 
When a parent is young, the phySical, financial and even emotional factors 
may often appear to favor the grandparents. One cannot expect young par­
ents to compete on an equal level with their established older relatives. So the 
"best interest" standard cannot be the test. If it were we would be forced to 
conclude that only the more affluent in our society should raise children. To 
state the proposition is to demonstrate its absurdity. 
Barstad v. Frazier, 348 N.W.2d 479, 483 (Wis. 1984); Janet Leach Richards, The Natural 
Parent Preference Versus Third Parties: Expanding the Definition of Parent, 16 NOVA L. 
REv. 733, 734-35 (1992). 
163. This Article suggests that courts should move away from the imprecise lexi­
cal definition of detriment and instead adopt a stipulative definition, giving all parties 
notice of the governing definition. CoPI, supra note 161, at 144-45. 
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should prove the parent's incapability by clear and convincing evi­
dence. This approach defers to the interests of family integrity, but 
provides a mechanism for assuring children are safe and cared-for. 
The standard implements the legislature's intent with even greater 
facility than the legislature was able to achieve. This definition of 
detriment for removal cases also achieves harmony with the other 
child removal statutory provisions that already exist. 
1. Defining Detriment 
In a case where a non-parent is seeking to remove custody 
from a parent, the judge's challenge is to decide at what point the 
. court should, interfere with and disrupt the daily parent-child rela­
tionship. Even without regard to the parent's rights or needs, re­
moval cases require the court to balance the conflicting needs of the 
child: those of safety and basic physical and emotional care with the 
child's need for the continuity of the emotional attachment with the 
parent. The child has a strong interest in staying with the parent.164 
The presumption that it is in the best interests of the child to be in 
the parent's care embodies the recognition that there is an ~mo­
tional bond between parent and child and that the child will suffer 
psychological harm if she is removed from the parent's care.165 For 
this reason, it is never a benefit to the child to remove her from a 
marginal, yet adequate, home simply for the reason that the non­
parent offers her a home with more physical comforts or a more 
skillful caretaker. Accepted wisdom holds that the pain of the sepa­
ration far outweighs the material advantages the non-parent can 
provide.166 
164. "So long as a child is a member of a functioning family, his paramount inter­
est lies in the preservation of his family." GOLDSTEIN, ET AL. supra note 20, at 5. 
165. Psychologists agree that separating a child from her pare,nts creates harm for 
the child. Both psychoanalytic theory and developmental studies establish "the need of 
every child for unbroken continuity of affection and stimulating relationships with an 
adult." GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20, at 6. Psychoanalytic theory suggests that 
once a child bonds with her psychological parent, separation is very damaging. Conse­
quently, removal is only appropriate in extreme cases, where it is the "least detrimental 
available alternative for safeguarding the child's growth and development." Id. at 53. 
Attachment theory similarly stresses the importance of parent-child bonds but suggests 
that children can form multiple attachments and that other factors can mitigate the 
harm of separation. Everett Waters & Donna M. Noyes, Psychological Parenting vs. 
Attachment Theory: The Child's Best Interests and the Risks in Doing the Right Things 
for the Wrong Reasons, XII REVIEw OF LAw & SoCIAL CHANGE 505, 512 (1983-84) 
(discussing the research and theories of Bowlby and Rutter). Nonetheless, psycholo­
gists supporting the attachment theory also advocate that courts and social agencies 
should be very cautious about removing children from their parents. Id. at 513. 
166. See supra note 163. 
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Obviously, however, there are parents who are simply incapa­
ble of taking adequate care of their children. In those cases the 
child's minimum care needs do outweigh the confusion, upheaval, 
and hurt the child will suffer from being removed from the parent. 
The court's obligation to decide when to intervene in a family is not 
new, nor is it unique to third-party custody cases under section 46b­
56b. Probate judges face the identical question when presented 
with a petition to remove a parent as a guardian.167 Juvenile mat­
ters judges do so as well when they rule on a petition to adjudicate a 
child as uncared-for, neglected or dependent.168 The Constitution 
and state statutes already require these courts to balance the need 
to protect children with the obligation to protect family autonomy. 
There is no rational basis for creating a test for defeating" a 
parent's custody different from those that already exist for guardi­
anship cases and juvenile matters cases. The fundamental nature of 
the rights of the family at stake are the same. The Connecticut 
Supreme Court has already recognized that the public policy in 
favor of family integrity is the same in cases transferring guardian­
ship to private parties and in those committing the child to the care 
of a state agency.169 Third-party custody removal cases raise the 
identical concern for family integrity. To the parent and the child, it 
matters little whether the case began because an Assistant Attorney 
General filed the case in juvenile court, or whether a family mem­
ber filed a petition in probate court or intervened in an existing 
superior court case. To the parent, all these cases pose the same 
question: "Will the judge take my child away?" To the child, these 
cases pose an equally basic question: "Where will I live?" 
The statutory predicate for removal of guardianship rights and 
for adjudication of a child as uncared-for, neglected, or dependent 
focuses on the parent: the ability to keep the child safe from physi­
cal injury and to provide the child with basic care. Neither standard 
allows removal for the simple fact that some other person is better 
able to raise the child or provide more for the child. In a contested 
guardianship case, Probate Judge Kurmay articulated the standard 
by which probate judges are to apply the guardianship statutes: 
.[T]he issue involved in this case is not whether the maternal aunt 
and uncle are better caretakers of J. than the natural mother. By 
167. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-61O (1995). See supra note 72 for the provisions of 
§ 45a-61O. 
168. § 46b-129. See supra note 54 for the provisions of § 45a-129. 
169. In re Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 603 (Conn. 1991). 
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the same token, the issue is not whether J. will perform better in 
the guardian's home rather than that of the mother. The only 
issue has been and remains whether the conduct has been so det­
rimental to the needs of the child as to warrant her removal pur­
suant to the specific standards in the previously cited Section of 
the Connecticut General Statutes. The focus, by legislative deci­
sion and by court interpretation, is on the conduct of the parent 
and not on the needs of the child. It is assumed by the State 
Legislature that a minimally-functioning parent is the appropri­
ate caretaker of that parent's child, even over another individual 
whose abilities are far superior to those of that parentPO 
This approach describes exactly how superior court judges 
should decide third-party custody removal cases. In a removal case, 
then, the court's inquiry must focus solely on the parent's present 
characteristics, but only insofar as those characteristics have an im­
pact on the child's well-being. Only when the parent's present ca­
pability to provide the child with the basic needs falls below an 
adequate level is it detrimental to the child to stay in the parent's 
care. l71 
In deciding the question of whether to remove the child, the 
court should not consider the potential third-party custodian in any 
way. The attributes and parenting capabilities of the non-parent 
are completely irrelevant to the determination of whether the par­
ent can care for his child. It is also inappropriate for the court to 
consider the type and nature of the relationship between the child 
and the non-parent. 
Most removal cases involve claims by non-parents who are 
170. In re Guardianship of J., Probate Court, District of Stratford, Sept. 4, 1990, 
(Kurmay, P.J.) slip op. at 3-4. As a result of abuse allegations against the mother and 
stepfather, Judge Kurmay had removed the mother as the child's guardian in 1987 when 
the child was seven years old, appointing the maternal aunt and uncle as guardians in 
the mother's stead. After laying down, in prior rulings, strict conditions for visitation 
and individual and family counseling, the court eventually reinstated the mother as 
guardian three years after her removal. The court found that the mother had "benefit­
ted immensely" from counseling and was "far better able to cope with the responsibility 
of raising J. than she ever was before." Id. at 4. Applying the standard to these facts, 
the court reinstated the mother with orders for the mother to continue in counseling. 
171. It is detrimental for a child to remain in the care of a parent who cannot 
fulfill the child's basic needs, regardless of why the parent cannot do so. Whether a 
parent is incapable because of mental illness, mental disability, lack of awareness, or 
substance abuse is irrelevant to the basic question of whether the parent can care for 
the child, although it may be very relevant to whether the parent can ever gain or regain 
the capacity to care for the child. Similarly, the guardianship statutes also require the 
court to measure a parent's ability and to ignore the origin of the parent's problem. 
§ 45a-610(3). 
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members of the child's extended family and whom the child knows 
and often loves.172 It is tempting, therefore, to decide removal 
cases on a "sliding scale" basis: the closer the emotional ties be­
tween the child and the non-parent, the less cause the court must 
find before it can remove the child. This approach is a dangerous 
dilution of the family's need for autonomy. The decision when to 
intervene in a family must remain a rigidly separate consideration 
from the question of where the child would live if the court re­
moved her.173 Nor does the presence of extended family members 
as alternative caretakers make removal a trouble-free solution to a 
nuclear family's problems. Placing the child with family members 
or friends will not lessen the child's pain of separation from the 
parent. It also invites family meddling and intergenerational con­
flicts,174 and underestimates the emotional investment the non-par­
ent may have in sabotaging the parent-child relationshipPs 
Because of the difficulties inherent in later returning children 
home, a court should not lightly enter into a removal case, and 
thereby invite, for some future time, the more complex conflicts of 
a reunification case. 
When evaluating the parent's present capabilities to care for 
the child, the superior court judge should adopt the same cautious 
level of scrutiny that probate and juvenile matters judges bring to 
their tasksp6 The court should look freely to the analogous prece­
172. The non-parent was a relative in all the reported third-party custody cases in 
Connecticut decided since the § 46b-56b was enacted and in most of the older habeas 
corpus cases as well. 
173. These decisions are distinguishable in other contexts, too. In guardianship 
cases, the court is only to examine the existence of a relationship between the child and 
prospective guardian when appointing a guardian after removal of the parent. § 45a­
617. Similarly, the case of In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875 (Conn. 
1979), requires a court to examine the grounds for terminating a parent's rights without 
considering the attributes of the prospective adoptive parents. See Sharon I. Farquhar­
son, Comment, The "Tho-Pronged" Inquiry - The Best Alternative for the Conflicting 
Rights Involved in Proceedings for Termination of Parental Rights, 13 CoNN. L. REV. 
709 (1981). 
174. Richards, supra note 162, at 734. 
175. Often intra-familial custody disputes end up being battles over other family 
grievances with the child as the battleground. Some of the ugliest stories arise when the 
parent is engaged in a custody battle with his or her own parents. See, for example, In 
re Jacqueline D., NO. N.87-128, No. 82341, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15, 
1992). Although DCF can place a committed child with "persons related by blood," 
§ 46b-129(d), there is literature warning child placement workers about the difficult 
dynamics involved in such placements. JOSEPH R. CARRIERI, CHILD ABUSE, NEGLEcr, 
AND THE FOSTER CARE SYSTEM, Practicing Law Institute (1993). 
176. The test for removal in abuse and neglect proceedings has been described as 
a determination of "whether the child can be protected from the specific harm(s) justi­
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dent of the guardianship and the abuse and neglect statutes and 
cases. The court will then have the necessary framework from 
which to evaluate the specific facts of the case in order to answer 
the only question relevant to a removal case: does this parent pres­
ently have the necessary emotional commitment and capability to 
fulfill his or her child's minimum needs·? Only if the court finds that 
the non-parent has proven that the parent is incapable of providing 
this minimum level of care do grounds exist for removal of the child 
from the parentP7 
One Connecticut judge has already gravitated to this type of 
inquiry in removal cases. In Foster v. Devino,178 Judge West em­
ployed exactly this examination of the parent's characteristics when 
he focussed on the capability of the mother to care for her chil­
dren's physical and emotional needs as a basis for determining what 
would be detrimental for the children.179 
2. Burden and Level of Proof 
In order to be consistent with the guardianship and juvenile 
matters cases, the court should always assign the burden of proof to 
the non-parent seeking removal.180 The quantum of proof by which 
fying intervention if left in the home." Michael S. Wald, State Intervention on Behalf of 
"Neglected" Children: Standards for Removal of Children from Their Homes, Monitor­
ing the Status of Children in Foster Care, and Termination of Parental Rights, 28 STAN. 
L. REv. 623, 650-51 (1976). The court should first vigorously examine whether services 
short of removal are "adequate to ensure the child will not be injured again." [d. 
177. The focus is on the parent's present capability. As is the usual case, past 
behavior including past abuse may be relevant but only to the extent it illuminates a 
parent's present characteristics. Past conduct is not an automatic indicator of current 
conduct. 
178. No. 0110479, 1994 Conn. Super: Ct. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994). 
179. There is also persuasive authority in other states supporting this approach 
with removal cases. In Texas, the presumption is rebutted by showing that granting 
custody to the parent "would significantly impair the child's physical health or emo­
tional development." TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 14.01(b)(I) (1994). In Lewelling v. Le­
welling, 796 S.W.2d 164 (Tex. 1990), the Supreme Court of Texas construed the statute 
as one requiring it to decide how dysfunctional the mother must be to be deemed to 
cause significant harm to her child. The court concluded that it would not impair the 
child to live with a mother who was unemployed, had periods of psychiatric treatment, 
and was a victim of spousal abuse. Id. at 167. There are also cases in other states where 
the non-parent has prevailed under this type of test. For example, in Hunt v. Whalen, 
565 N.E.2d. 1109 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991), the Indiana Court of Appeals upheld the finding 
that the grandparents had rebutted the parental presumption with clear and convincing 
evidence by showing that the mother was unable to provide adequate nutrition for the 
child, had failed to follow specific medical advice for treating the child, and had no 
source of income, id. at 1111, all of which are, arguably, indicators of the parent's inabil­
ity to meet the child's basic needs. 
180. The legislature was silent when it enacted § 46b-56b regarding which party 
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the non-parent should prove his or her case is less clear. As the 
statute currently stands, rebutting the presumption takes proof of 
detriment by a preponderance of the evidence.181 This is the same 
standard as in the juvenile matters adjudication phase and in tem­
porary custody decisions but is a less demanding standard than the 
clear and convincing evidence rule utilized in guardianship cases. It 
is, therefore, impossible to recommend a rule that would be com­
pletely consistent with both of the other types of cases. 
It is better policy, and more logical, to adopt a clear and con­
vincing evidence rule for removal cases.182 In many ways, third­
party custody cases are more like guardianship cases than juvenile 
matters cases. Both third-party custody and guardianship cases are 
initiated by private parties,183 and the time frame of the non-par­
ent's custody or guardianship is open-ended.l84 In a juvenile mat­
ters case, the court's adjudication of a child as uncared-for, 
neglected, or dependent does not necessarily result in her removal 
from her parent.185 The neglect finding often becomes the mere 
predicate for the provision of free services, and DCF supervision is 
sufficient to keep the child safe and well cared-for. In contrast, the 
fundamental issue in both guardianship and third-party custody 
cases is the· child's residence. There are no options short of a 
change in the child's home. Furthermore, neither the guardianship 
bears the burden of persuasion. In Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the court 
assigned the parent the burden of proof because she had initiated the case through a 
modification motion. However, the court should not assign the burden of proof based 
on the accident of procedural posture. The burden of proof should always be assigned 
to the non-parent as a function of the substantive preference for the parent, in accord­
ance with the recommendation of STRONG, supra 105, that a presumption is a rule that 
assigns the burden of persuasion. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized in 
other contexts, where a fundamental constitutional right is involved, that the burden of 
proof is always on the party seeking to interfere with that right. In re Jessica M., 586 
A.2d 597,605 (Conn. 1990). In order to assign the burden of proof to the non-parent in 
every instance, it would take action by the Connecticut Supreme Court to alter that part 
of the holding in Perez or a legislative amendment to the statute. 
18l. The legislature adopted the usual civil standard of preponderance of the evi­
dence when it rejected the use of the clear and convincing standard. 
182. Adopting this standard of clear and convincing evidence for removal cases 
would require legislative change. 
183. In both, neither the court nor the DCF closely supervise the non-parent's 
ongoing custody of the child. . 
184. The parent who has lost his child in a guardianship or third-party custody 
case must initiate a proceeding to be reunited with his child. Juvenile commitments are 
usually limited to eighteen months. § 46b-129(d). 
185. In re Juvenile Appeal, 471 A.2d 1380, 1384-85 (Conn. 1984). Indeed, it was 
precisely the fact that removal is not the automatic result of an adjudication that per­
suaded the court to adopt a preponderance standard in neglect cases. Id. 
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decision in probate court nor the third-party custody decision in su­
perior court will automatiCally trigger the family's access to the sup­
portive services of DCF.186 As a consequence, a judge deciding a 
third-party custody case may feel removal is the only available 
method to assure the child's safety. 
B. Reunification Cases 
Reunification cases arise in a variety of ways. Some are the 
second stage to a removal case after the parent has rehabilitated 
himself and has returned to the court that ordered the removal. 
Others may result from the actions of a ,parent trying to undo a 
voluntary private placement.187 Reunification cases also can in­
volve parents who have never lacked the capability to care for their 
children nor have they been "at fault" for the separation. A prime 
example of this latter kind of case arises after a divorce, when a 
custodial parent and child live with a third-party such as a steppar­
ent or a grandparent. If the custodial parent dies or leaves the child 
for any other reason, the noncustodial parent may be drawn into a 
dispute with the third-party with whom the child has been living.1ss 
186. The court could always refer the family to DCF and can order the parent to 
cooperate with the workers as Judge West did in Foster v. Devino, FA 94-0110479, 1994 
Conn. Super. LEXIS 1161 at *2 (May 5, 1994). None of these actions are automatic, 
however, and DCF is free to define its role with the family in accordance with its own 
regulations, since the Commissioner is not a party to a guardianship or third-party case. 
187. There may well be a correlation between a parent's socioeconomic status 
and his tendency to use voluntary placements during a crisis. Professor Guggenheim 
posits that children from poor and minority families are more apt to be seized by the 
state if the parent has a problem, while a middle or upper class. parent wiII have the 
family resources to assist them or the financial resources to hire help, so that the state 
will never know about the family crisis. He suggests that once the state has intervened 
in a family, the child is less likely to return home. Martin Guggenheim, The Political 
and Legal Implications of the Psychological Parenting Theory. 12 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
Soc. CHANGE 549, 549-50 (1983-84). While there are undoubtedly many cases where 
this is true, there also may be cases where the opposite is true. Although state interven­
tion is carried out in an imperfect system. there are at least statutorily mandated safe­
guards for the parent and an explicit policy in favor of family reunification. Unless 
third-party custody cases are construed similarly, a voluntary placement arrangement 
gone awry will give the parent fewer safeguards and, thus, less certainty that his child 
will ever come home again. 
188. The noncustodial parent does not have to be unfit or lacking as a parent to 
lose custody to an ex-spouse. Nor does he have to consent to his child living with the 
non-parent, who the custodial parent chose unilaterally. 
Even a case where the parent and child have actually never lived together may 
present a reunification case. In these cases, the term "reunification" may technically be 
a misnomer, but the issues and the analysis are the same. If the child's parents never 
lived together with the child, the noncustodial parent seeking custody from the non­
parent may never have had anything more than a visiting parent relationship. This fact 
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In a reunification case, the court should focus solely on the psy­
chological impact that a change in custody will have on the child. 
This approach allows a court to give priority to the goal of bringing 
families back together while permitting it to identify those cases 
where it is simply too late to reunite the family.189 Defining detri­
ment this way in a reunification case furthers the objectives of the 
Connecticut legislature, and achieves consistency with the guardian­
ship and juvenile matters standards. 
1. Defining Detriment 
In the context of a reunification case, the court's task is to de­
cide whether it is appropriate to disrupt the bond between the child 
should not automatically exclude the noncustodial parent from consideration, although 
it will weaken the likelihood that the parent will prevail. 
In some jurisdictions, a "rescinded adoption" case would fall within this sub-cate­
gory. For example, the Michigan courts ultimately decided "Baby Jessica's" fate under 
the Michigan third-party custody rules. In re Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993), 
stays denied, 114 S. Ct. 1 (1993). In Connecticut, the supreme court decided a similar 
rescinded adoption case, In re Baby Girl B., 618 A.2d 1 (Conn. 1992), pursuant to a 
different standard in juvenile court and not as a third-party custody case. The Connect­
icut decision upheld the trial court's decision to reopen a judgment terminating parental 
rights and its finding that the state had not proven the grounds for termination. After 
those determinations, the return of the child to her biological mother was automatic. 
Commentators have criticized this practice, recommending instead that courts decide 
with whom the child will live as a third-party custody case, separate from the termina­
tion and adoption decision. See, e.g., Kirsten Korn, Comment, The Struggle for the 
Child: Preserving the Family in Adoption Disputes Between Biological Parents and Third 
Parties, 72 N.C.L. REv. 1279, 1330 (1994). While Connecticut has not expressly fol­
lowed this approach, the legislature has adopted a new law that no longer allows a court 
to return a child automatically if an adoption fails. 1993 Conn. Acts 170 (Reg. Sess.). If 
the child's adoption is not yet final, the court is now required to reopen the termination 
only if it is in the child's best interests. For the purpose of this Act only, the best 
interests of the child include consideration of the following: 
the age of the child, the nature of the relationship of the child with the care­
taker of the child, the length of time the child has been in the custody of the 
caretaker, the nature of the relationship of the child with the birth parent, the 
length of time the child has been in the custody of the birth parent, any rela­
tionship that may exist between the child and siblings or other children in the 
caretaker's household, and the psychological and medical needs of the child. 
The determination of the best interest of the child shall not be based on a 
consideration of the socio-economic status of the birth parent or the caretaker. 
Id. 
189. It may be too late for the child to live with her parent no matter how 
"blameless" the parent is. Consider the. case where the custodial parent has died and 
the child is living with her stepparent. Even if the visiting parent has maintained a close 
relationship with his child, the parent may nonetheless lose his bid for custody against 
the stepparent if the child has half-siblings. While this result may seem unfair to the 
parent, it is more important to consider how it affects the child. Moreover, the parent is 
really no worse off than he was when his ex-spouse was still alive. 
245 1995] DETERMINING DETRIMENT TO THE CHILD 
and the non-pare~t. The legislature, by adopting this presumption, 
has mandated that the court must start with the premise that the 
child should return to the parent and has determined that the divid­
ing line is substantial detriment to the child. The presumption 
translates into an affirmative policy that a capable parent can be 
reunited with his child under certain circumstances, even if the non­
parent has taken superb care of the child.1OO Therefore, the pre­
sumption in favor of the parent requires the court to reject a com­
parison approach, as it does in a removal case. The court is not to 
select the better caretaker nor to decide the case on the simple basis 
that the status quo is fine because the child is performing well 
where she is. 
Just as with removal cases, the task before the superior court in 
a reunification case is not a unique one. Probate judges must de­
cide when, if ever, to reinstate removed parents as guardians.191 Ju­
venile matters judges face a similar question when parents file 
petitions to revoke the commitment of their children to the state192 
or simply at the expiration of an eighteen month commitment. 
Once again, it makes no sense to create a new test to use only in 
third-party custody cases. The presumption in favor of the parent 
is, quite simply, another way to state the policy in favor of reuniting 
families and enhancing parental capacity.t93 It is appropriate, then, 
to look to the probate court precedent and juvenile matters deci­
sions for guidance in third-party custody reunification cases. 
Both guardianship reinstatement and revocation of commit­
ment cases require the court to determine as a first step whether the 
original cause for the child's removal still exists.t94 Resolving a 
reunification custody case will also often require the court to en­
gage in a two-step process.195 The court's threshold consideration 
190. Indeed, this factor can have an ironic effect. The better the level of care has 
been by the caretaker, the more likely that the child will have the emotional strength to 
adjust to yet another move. See Waters and Noyes, supra note 165, at 512. 
191. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-611 (1995). 
192. § 46b-129(g). 
193. § 17a-101(a). 
194. § 46b-129(f) (1995); In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 887 
(Conn. 1979); In re Guardianship of J., slip op. (Probate Dist. of Stratford, July 18, 1989 
and Sept. 4, 1990) (Kurmay P.J.). 
195. Especially when the court previously has removed the child from the par­
ent's custody, the court will have to find first that the cause for the removal no longer 
exists. But even in cases where the court never found the parent to be incapable of 
caring for his child, the non-parent may raise the issue, as a matter of good-faith or just 
as a tactical maneuver. Either way, it is inevitable that a court will first have to deter­
mine whether or not the parent is capable of meeting the child's minimum needs. 
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must be whether the parent is capable of having custody. Only a 
capable parent is entitled to the benefit of the presumption of sec­
tion 46b-56b.196 
Assuming the court finds the parent meets the minimum stan­
dard of parental capability, the court must then wrestle with the 
second and often tougher question in a reunification case: even 
though the parent is fully capable of caring for his child, should the 
child nonetheless remain living with the non-parent? The court 
must compare the child's interest in reuniting her biological family 
with her interest in preserving the family unit of which she is now a 
part.197 It is at this point that the child's needs are more likely to be 
in conflict with those of her parent. 
The only evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption in favor 
of a capable parent is proof that the move itself will be substantially 
detrimental to the child. The sole relevant factor is the degree of 
psychological impact that the change in custody will have on the 
child. Here the court is faced with trying to look into the future and 
draw the line between an ordinary readjustment process and psy­
chological harm of a long-term nature. 
In a revocation of commitment case in Connecticut, it is the 
state's burden to prove that "revocation would not be in the child's 
best interests. "198 This is a high burden that the Connecticut 
Supreme Court has expressed in terms of whether the shift of cus­
tody back to the parent would be "detrimental" to the child,199 The 
court has determined that for revocation cases, the trial courts must 
assess the following factors: (1) the length of the child's stay in fos­
ter care; (2) the nature of the child's relationship with the foster 
parents; (3) the degree of contact maintained with the natural par­
ent; and (4) the nature of the child's relationship to the natural par­
ent,2oo These factors are wholly applicable to reunification cases.201 
196. This inquiry is the same analysis of -the parent's present capabilities as that 
required by the removal cases. 
197. With respect to reunification cases, the psychological parent theory and the 
attachment theory are in less agreement than on the removal issue. Under Goldstein, 
Freud, and Solnit's theory, once the child is removed and forms a new bond, the courts 
should safeguard that relationship just as jealously as the original parent-child bond . 
. GOLDSTEIN ET AL., supra note 20 at 53. In contrast, attachment theory supports a view 
that family ties are usually enduring so that children often can go home again without 
severe upset. See Waters & Noyes, supra note 165, at 512-13. 
198. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d at 882. 
199. Id. 
200. Id. at 882-83. In this case, the parent had been in a mental hospital in Maine 
and had very limited contact with her child. The Connecticut Supreme Court upheld 
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In essence, they focus the court's attention on the question of how 
difficult it will be for the child to move back to the parent's 
home.202 
Unlike a removal case, this prong of a reunification case does 
require a "sliding scale" analysis: the closer the bond between the 
parent and the child, the less likely a court will find that a move will 
cause the child substantial harm. The corollary is also true. The 
closer the bond between the non-parent and the child, the more 
likely it will be that the court will find that a move will cause emo­
tional trauma to the child. 
The "impact on the child" approach incorporates the guidance 
that Justice Parskey offered in the McGaffin dissent203 and is con­
sistent with the court's statement in Perez .204 Both opinions en­
dorsed the concept that it takes something more than normal 
adjustment difficulties to rebut the presumption in favor of a par­
ent. It is also quite close to the one Judge Teller used in the case of 
In re Jacqueline D.205 when he considered how long the child had 
been separated from her father, how fully engaged she was in her 
life with her grandparents, and how unlikely it was that the father 
would be capable of assisting his daughter's readjustment.206 
The distinction between "normal" adjustment difficulties and 
long-term harm is one that some of the other trial judges in Con­
necticut have failed to make. In Busa v. Busa207 and Sherman v. 
Sherman,208 for example, the judges recognized that the effect of 
the move was a relevant factor, but undercut the presumption by 
assuming any move was sufficiently difficult on the child to justify 
leaving the child with the non-parent.209 The judges identified the 
the trial court's denial of the petition to revoke commitment but ordered DCYS to 
make active efforts to strengthen the parent's relationship with her child. 
201. Indeed, the Connecticut Supreme Court even called its rule for revocation of 
commitment cases a "presumption" in favor of allowing the child to return home and 
cited as its authority a leading third-party custody case from New York,In re Bennett v. 
Jeffreys, 356 N.E.2d 277 (N.Y. 1976). 
202. These factors are very similar to those enunciated in a new Connecticut law 
that established the standard for courts to consider when asked to reopen or set aside a 
termination of parental rights judgment. See 1993 Conn. Acts 170 (Reg. Sess.). 
203. McGaffin v. Roberts, 479 A.2d 176, 186 (Conn. 1984), ceTt. denied, 470 U.S. 
1050 (1985). 
204. Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 915 (Conn. 1989). 
205. No. 87-128, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1037 (Apr. 15, 1992). 
206. Id. Although he did not use these precise words, the judge clearly believed 
that Jacqueline would suffer long-term emotional harm if her father had custody. Id. 
207. FA 82-0112775, 1991 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 1351 (June 7, 1991). 
208. FA 90-02692085, 1992 Conn. Super. Ct. LEXIS 2353 (July 29, 1992). 
209. There is one unreported reunification case in Connecticut where the judge 
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correct factor but set too low a threshold for it properly to consti­
tute detriment.210 
2. Burden and Level of Proof 
In guardianship and juvenile matters cases, the burden of proof 
is on the parent to prove his rehabilitation.211 It makes sense to 
adopt this rule from those analogous cases for reunification cases 
that are the second stage of a case where a court has previously 
removed the child. The parent who had lost custody by court order 
in a third-party custody removal case must demonstrate his new pa­
rental capability by a preponderance of the evidence when seeking 
to restore custodial rights. 
For reunification cases that are fresh judicial determinations of 
custody between the parent and the non-parent,212 there is no basis 
appears to have correctly applied the impact factor. In Yeargan v. Merrick, FA 90­
0271030, Judicial District of Fairfield at Bridgeport, Nov. 27, 1990 (Hauser, J.), the 
judge returned two young sons to their mother, who had previously placed her sons 
with distant family members after a difficult separation from her abusive husband and 
the sudden death of her father. At the time of the court's decision, the boys had been 
in Pennsylvania for almost two years, having had only sporadic contact with their 
mother. The non-parents had taught the children to caIl them "Mom and Dad" and had 
changed the boys' first and last names. After the court determined that the mother was 
a fit parent, the court ordered the return of the boys, even though they surely faced a 
chaIlenging adjustment period. To assist them, the court had already increased visita­
tion, and, in his final order, he also ordered the mother to continue in counseling for at 
least two years and to include her sons in the therapy. 
210. There is Significant caselaw in other jurisdictions supporting the "impact on 
the child" definition of detriment in reunification cases. The Supreme Court of Colo­
rado held that the presumption in favor of the parent is rebutted if removing a child 
from a non-parent and awarding custody to the parent "would be extremely detrimental 
to the child and would likely result in permanent damage to her personality and devel­
opment." Root v. AIlen, 377 P.2d 117, 121 (Colo. 1962). Similarly, Virginia measures 
whether returning custody to a parent would have a "significant harmful long term 
impact" on the child. Bailes v. Sours, 340 S.E.2d 824, 827 (Va. 1986). In Florida, as in 
Connecticut, a court may award custody to a non-parent if awarding custody to a parent 
would cause detriment to the child. In re Guardianship of D.A. McW, 460 So. 2d 368, 
370 (Fla. 1984). The Florida courts have defined detriment as: 
circumstances that produce or are likely to produce lasting mental physical or 
emotional harm .... [It is] more than the normal trauma caused to a child by 
uprooting him from familiar surroundings such as often occurs by reason of 
divorce, death of a parent or adoption. It contemplates a longer term adverse 
effect that transcends the normal adjustment period in such cases. 
In re Marriage of Matzen, 600 So. 2d 487, 490, (Fla. Dist. Q. App. 1992). 
In Minnesota, proof that an emotionaIly-delayed child would suffer "severe emo­
tional and behavioral regression" if she were moved again was sufficient to overcome 
the presumption. Durkin v. Hinich, 442 N.W.2d 148, 153 (Minn. 1989). 
211. In re Juvenile Appeal (Anonymous), 420 A.2d 875, 881 (Conn. 1979). 
212. A reunification scenario where there has been no prior court-ordered re­
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to place the burden of proof on the parent.213 If the non-parent 
raises the issue of the parent's fitness, he or she should have the 
burden of proving the parent's incapacity, preferably by clear and 
convincing evidence,214 exactly as he or she would be required to do 
in a removal case.2IS 
Once the parent's capability is established, the court must de­
termine the degree and type of impact that a move would have on 
the child. It should be the non-parent's burden2I6 to prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the move will cause a serious 
impact on the child. This allocation of the burden makes the ap­
proach consistent with the cases in the probate courts and juvenile 
matters division. 
moval cannot occur in an abuse and neglect case. It is also highly unlikely to occur in a 
guardianship case. If a parent voluntarily leaves his child with a family member or 
friend, that non-parent mayor may not act to make the arrangement official by going to 
probate court for a guardianship order with the parent's consent. If the non-parent had 
gone to probate court to be appointed as the child's guardian, then the later dispute 
over the return of the child would not be the initial court action. If the non-parent had 
never made the custody arrangement official, then the parent would file a habeas 
corpus case in superior court to get his child back. The parent would not file in probate 
court for reinstatement of his guardianship rights because, technically, he never lost 
them. 
213. This would be true even for cases where the parent placed his child volunta­
rily with the non-parent. The rationale for "preferring" this parent by not requiring him 
to prove his capability is to reward him for recognizing his own limitations and choosing 
to safeguard his child's needs. 
214. See supra notes 182-186 and accompanying text. 
215. Once again, any clear and convincing standard would require legislative 
amendment to the third-party custody statute. For the first prong of a reunification 
case, it is appropriate to require the non-parent to prove the same type of evidence by 
the same quantum of evidence as in a removal case. Requiring the non-parent to prove 
the parent's incapacity guarantees consistent standards for all initial judicial decisions 
that relate to a parent's fitness to care for the child. It is possible that a parent, by 
placing the child voluntarily, has drawn the line for acceptable parenting at a level that 
is higher than where a court would have set the limit in a contested proceeding. The 
parent should not be penalized for wanting to make sure the child received more than 
he could provide. 
216. Because of the Connecticut Supreme Court's decision in Perez v. Perez, 561 
A.2d 907 (Conn. 1989), the burden of proof now may be on the parent in a reunification 
case if he files the case as a modification rather than as a habeas corpus case. The 
presumption, because it is a substantive policy statement, requires a method for decid­
ing these cases more enduring than that adopted in Perez. Professor McCormick recog­
nizes that, although courts usually assign the burden of persuasion to the party seeking 
to change the current state of affairs, this is not always true if special policy considera­
tions are relevant. STRONG, supra note 105, § 337 at 570-71. 
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The presumption in favor of a parent requires a judge to con­
sider more than just whom he or she will choose as the custodian. 
The presumption states a policy in favor of family preservation that 
also places a responsibility on the superior court judges to actively 
protect the bonds between parent and child. Yet again, this policy 
is no different than that which guides the probate judges and juve­
nile matters judges.217 
When Probate Judge Kurmay removed a mother as guard­
ian,218 he retained jurisdiction over the matter, ordered liberal but 
structured visitation, and ordered the parent and child to undergo 
counseling, both individually and jointly. The court monitored the 
case closely. Three years later, the mother achieved the necessary 
level of capability that enabled the court to reinstate her guardian­
ship rights. It was not too late to do so, in part because the judge 
did everything in his power to protect the relationship between 
mother and daughter. 
It is this kind of approach that the superior court judges must 
take in third-party custody cases. H removal is necessary, then the 
court must clearly articulate its basis for finding the parent lacked 
the capability to care for the child. The decision should state ex­
actly what the parent must do in order to regain custody. The court 
should also order the parties, including the child, to participate in 
counseling whenever it is even arguably appropriate.219 Finally, the 
court should order the maximum amount of appropriate visitation 
between parent and child, including overnight visits, so that the 
child will maintain a sense of the parent's house as "home."22o 
217. The Connecticut Supreme Court has recognized that the private parties 
seeking guardianship of a child do not have the same affirmative obligation to provide 
services to the parents that the state does in abuse and neglect commitment cases. In re 
Jessica M., 586 A.2d 597, 602-03 (Conn. 1991). This truism, however, does not relieve 
the judges from using the full breadth of their authority and range of remedies to assist 
parents in enhancing their parental capacity for good child care. 
218. In re Guardianship of J., Probate District of Stratford, (Kurmay, P.J.) (Sept. 
4, 1990). 
219. While the court is not in a position to transport forcibly people to their coun­
seling sessions, it is still useful to issue counseling orders. If a parent does not follow 
through with counseling, that failure may form the basis for the court's subsequent re­
fusal to reunite the parent and child. The court can also adjudicate the custodial non­
parent in contempt in an extreme case where the non-parent is obstructing the child's 
counseling. 
220. The court should recognize that a non-parent who wishes to retain custody 
permanently has a vested interest in undermining the relationship between parent and 
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Judge West took just this approach in Foster v. Devino.221 He 
wrote that he believed that the grandparents' custody should con­
tinue for only so long as is absolutely necessary.222 The opinion lays 
out a blueprint for the mother: if she follows it, the judge will most 
likely be able to send her children back home; if not, the children 
will remain with their grandparents until it is too late for them to go 
back. 
Judges deciding reunification cases should consider whether 
ordering a structured period of transition would be an appropriate 
step. If the sole consideration is the impact of the move on the 
child, then the judge sometimes holds the key to the successful re­
adjustment. Rather than denying custody to a parent because there 
is a rupture in the parent-child relationship, the court should take 
an active role in attempting to repair that bond. Especially where 
the relationship has been weakened by distance or visitation dis­
putes with the non-parent, a period of gradual transition may be 
entirelyappropriate.223 As the Connecticut Supreme Court said in 
Perez, the court must give a parent a reasonable opportunity to nur­
ture a poor relationship between parent and child.224 
CONCLUSION 
This article identifies several goals that establish the frame­
work for deciding how best to resolve third-party custody cases.22S 
The first is that the standard must acknowledge the constitutionally 
protected rights of families to stay together whenever feasible. 
child and may very well sabotage the visitation. The court should be an active partici­
pant in protecting the visitation by responding swiftly to motions for contempt and with 
the liberal use of make-up visits and sanctions such as fines. 
221. FA 94-0110479, 1994 Conn. Super. Q. LEXIS 1161 (May 5, 1994). 
222. [d. at *20. 
223. In In re Guardianship of A & B, 5 Conn. Probate L.J. 15 (1989), Stratford 
Probate Judge Kurmay denied reinstatement of a mother's guardianship rights over her 
children who had been living with their grandfather for seven years. The mother was in 
prison and then .worked out of state and had maintained only limited contact with the 
children. However, the court did order an increased visitation schedule, ordered the 
mother to participate monthly in the children's therapy sessions, and scheduled a re­
hearing in the near future to reexamine the nature of the children's relationship with 
their mother. Similarly, in Lewis v. Taylor, 554 So. 2d 158 (La. Ct. App. 1989), the court 
ordered a six month transition period to assure a smoother change for the children and 
to undo the damage done by the non-parents' resistance to visitation. 
224. Perez v. Perez, 561 A.2d 907, 916 (Conn. 1989). 
225. These recommended definitions of detriment effectuate the legislative intent 
by construing the current statute. The recommendations regarding the allocation of the 
burden of proof would require action by the supreme court or the legislature, and those 
changes addressing the necessary level of proof would require legislative change. 
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Courts must decide when a child's interests diverge from those of 
the parent and then must find a way to balance these conflicting 
rights fairly. Second, courts must implement the legislatively man­
dated policy when the standard is pronounced by statute, as it is in 
Connecticut. Legislative intent is the touchstone for construction. 
When the legislature does not articulate every aspect of its policy 
exhaustively, then the courts must fill in any gaps in order to further 
the task the legislature started, not frustrate it. Finally, when other 
statutory schemes exist, and there is a significant similarity and 
overlap in the cases that reach each of the courts, the courts must 
strive towards consistency, looking beyond the quirks of jurisdiction 
and the procedural posture of cases. 
Achieving these goals requires the ini~ial recognition that, in a 
parental presumption jurisdiction such as Connecticut, the court's 
job in every third-party custody case is to consider whether there 
will be substantial emotional or physical harm to the child if she 
remains in or returns to the parent's custody. The court may not 
define its task as a comparison of the two environments in the 
search for the most benefits to the child or the better caretaker. 
Since the type of harm and how to measure it varies considerably 
with whether the case is a removal or a reunification case, the sec­
ond step requires recognition that the definition of detriment and 
method of rebuttal of the presumption -will also vary. 
In a removal case, the court should only award custody to the 
non-parent if he or she has proven that the parent is incapable of 
meeting the child's basic, minimum needs. In determining the effi­
cacy of removal, it is only "detrimental to the child" to be in the 
care of a parent who cannot care for her adequately. If the judge 
concludes that removal is necessary, the opinion should state clearly 
the grounds for removal and should fashion visitation and counsel­
ing orders that will foster an on-going, and hopefully improved, par­
ent-child relationship. 
When a parent seeks to be reunited with. the child, the court 
must first distinguish between those cases where the removal was 
by a prior court order based on a finding of parental incapability 
and those where the separation was the result of some voluntary 
action by the parent. This distinction dictates whether the parent 
must first prove his capability by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Assuming that the court finds that the parent meets the minimum 
standard of parental capability, the sole remaining issue is an evalu­
ation of the psychological impact that the move back to the parent 
would have on the child. The non-parent has the burden of proving 
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by a preponderance of the evidence that the change in custody 
would have a negative effect on the child of a magnitude in excess 
of usual adjustment difficulties. It is "detrimental to the child" to 
be reunited with her parent only if the move would cause substan­
tiallong-term psychological harm to the child. 
Third-party custody cases require trial courts to decide pre­
cisely when to separate parent and child and when to refuse to reu­
nite them.· The judges are often barraged with information and 
opinions from the competing custodians, the child, their counsel, 
and expert witnesses. With only the ambiguous concept of detri­
ment as guidance, it has proven to be a difficult task for the court to 
find, amidst all that noise, the few truly relevant factors in a third­
party custody case. This Article provides the policy and evidentiary 
considerations and specific definitions for deciding these cases fairly 
for the adults, while protecting the child caught in the middle. 
